




G. Ackerman, P. Abhayaratne, J. Bale, A.
Bhattacharjee, C. Blair, L. Hansell, A. Jayne, M. Kosal,




 This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their 
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any 
specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United 
States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein 
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, 





 This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of 
California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48. 
 
UCRL-TR-227068 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies  














The Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program 
 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
460 Pierce Street 

















Mary Beth Ward, Technical Project Monitor 
International Assessments Program 







Science and Technology Directorate 


































ʺTo  build  and  implement  a  robust  strategy  to  protect  our  critical 
infrastructures  and  key  assets  from  further  terrorist  exploitation, we 
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEFINITIONS FROM 
THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
 
Banking and Finance: A critical infrastructure characterized by entities, such as retail and commercial organizations, 
investment institutions, exchange boards, trading houses, and reserve systems, and associated operational 
organizations, government operations, and support activities, that are involved in all manner of monetary transactions, 
including its storage for saving purposes, its investment for income purposes, its exchange for payment purposes, and 
its disbursement in the form of loans and other financial instruments. 
 
Electrical Power Systems: A critical infrastructure characterized by generation stations, transmission and distribution 
networks that create and supply electricity to end-users so that end-users achieve and maintain nominal functionality, 
including the transportation and storage of fuel essential to that system. 
 
Emergency Services: A critical infrastructure characterized by medical, police, fire, and rescue systems and personnel 
that are called upon when an individual or community is responding to emergencies. These services are typically 
provided at the local level (county or metropolitan area). In addition, state and Federal response plans define emergency 
support functions to assist in response and recovery. 
 
Gas and Oil Production, Storage and Transportation: A critical infrastructure characterized by the production and 
holding facilities for natural gas, crude and refined petroleum, and petroleum-derived fuels, the refining and processing 
facilities for these fuels and the pipelines, ships, trucks, and rail systems that transport these commodities from their 
source to systems that are dependent upon gas and oil in one of their useful forms. 
 
Information and Communications: A critical infrastructure characterized by computing and telecommunications 
equipment, software, processes, and people that support: the processing, storage, and transmission of data and 
information; the processes and people that convert data into information and information into knowledge; and the data 
and information themselves. 
 
Transportation: A critical infrastructure characterized by the physical distribution system critical to supporting the 
national security and economic well-being of this nation, including the national airspace system, airlines and aircraft, and 
airports; roads and highways, trucking and personal vehicles; ports and waterways and the vessels operating thereon; 
mass transit, both rail and bus; pipelines, including natural gas, petroleum, and other hazardous materials; freight and 
long haul passenger rail; and delivery services. 
 
Water Supply Systems: A critical infrastructure characterized by the sources of water, reservoirs and holding facilities, 
aqueducts and other transport systems, the filtration, cleaning and treatment systems, the pipelines, the cooling systems 
and other delivery mechanisms that provide for domestic and industrial applications, including systems for dealing with 
















































































CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEFINITIONS FROM EXECUTIVE ORDER 13228 
 
…The Office shall coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of 
terrorist attacks. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private 
entities, as appropriate, to: 
  
…strengthen measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical 
facilities; other utilities; telecommunications; facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material; and other 
critical infrastructure services and critical facilities within the United States from terrorist attack;  
 
…coordinate efforts to protect critical public and privately owned information systems within the United States from 
terrorist attack;  
 
…coordinate efforts to protect transportation systems within the United States, including railways, highways, 
shipping, ports and waterways, and airports and civilian aircraft, from terrorist attack;  
 
…coordinate efforts to protect United States livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food 
























































STATEMENT OF POLICY FROM THE 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 2001 
 
(c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES- It is the policy of the United States –  
 
(1) that any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, 
geographically limited in effect, manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy, human and government 
services, and national security of the United States;  
 
(2) that actions necessary to achieve the policy stated in paragraph (1) be carried out in a public-private partnership 
involving corporate and non-governmental organizations; and  
 
(3) to have in place a comprehensive and effective program to ensure the continuity of essential Federal Government 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































b) if  (based  on  general  investigator  knowledge  or  the  scale/nature  of  the  incident)  there  was  reasonable 
certainty that there was a major impact, the incident was included as a major incident; 
c) if there was uncertainty of the magnitude of the impact, the case was researched further;  


























































































































































Attacks  on  Oil/Gas  Infrastructure  contributed  to  more  than  50%  of  the  attacks  in  Europe  and  Latin 
America/Caribbean. Significantly, in the Middle East/North Africa region, the attacks on Oil/Gas Infrastructure 
accounted  for  85% of  the  attacks on CI. The high percentage of  attacks on CI  in  this  region  could be partly 
attributed to the vast number of oil and gas  infrastructure targets  in the region, and the vulnerability of those 





















































































































































































































































































































    
Number of CI Attacks by Decade





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Some increase    :  +      Some decrease    :  − 
Significant increase  :  ++      Significant decrease  :  − −  
Large increase    :  +++      Large decrease    :  − − −  






















                                                 
427 Capability and vulnerability are therefore only important in so much as they affect motivations.  We are primarily 
interested in terrorists’ perceptions of their capabilities and target vulnerability, even if these differ considerably from the 


























Figure 5.2: Progressive Restriction of Target Space 





2) Operational Objectives 
3) Perceived 
Capabilities4) Post-surveillance













Step 1: Preliminary Investigation 
 
The first step involves investigating whether there are any overt or covert signs that the group possesses 
the intent to launch a serious attack against critical infrastructure.  If so, the analysis terminates with a 
presumption of intent. 
 
Step 2: Data Collection 
 
The framework is almost entirely data driven, so the next step is for analysts to collect as much general 
data on the group and its environment as possible. A list of questions useful to the framework is 
contained in Figure V-3. Of course, it is highly unlikely that the answers to all, or even most, of these 
questions will be available (at least in the time frame available to most analysts). However, the more 
questions that can be answered and the greater detail with which these answers can be given, the fewer 
inferences will be necessary and the greater the utility of the framework will be. 
 
The framework can be used by analysts working in both the open and classified realms – all that differs 




− manifestos, communiqués and other publications produced by the group to communicate to their 
perceived constituency;  
− interviews given by group members;  
− internal group documents that have become public;  
− court transcripts (including witness testimony and prosecution evidence);  
− scholarly work;  
− news reports; 
− personal interviews with experts and investigative journalists 
 
Classified: 
− visual surveillance;  
− communications intercepts;  
− prisoner interrogation;  
− reliable informant reports;  
− confiscated materials (documents, computer files, etc.) 
 
An integral part of this step is obviously a determination by the analyst of the credibility of sources and 





Step 3: Factor Analysis 
 
It is at this stage that the data is applied to the framework. Each factor429 is considered in turn430 and 
makes a specific contribution to the final determination of intent regarding target selection. The order in 
which analysts undertake this is largely unimportant, so long as the result of analyzing each factor is 
noted. In order to assist DECIDe users to keep track of their analysis, a worksheet has been provided 
(Appendix II). 
 
The following procedure is followed for EACH factor: 
 
a) The analysis of each factor begins with a list of the data requirements that need to be met to 
complete the analysis of that factor. These requirements are drawn from the master list of 
questions discussed in Step 2. Where information is available, it should be included. If all the 
requirements are met, analysts can proceed directly to step c) below.  
b) Where the required information is unavailable, analysts then proceed to the Factor Influences 
List for the current factor, which details all the influences on the current factor that this study has 
been able to discern.431 After reading and considering these influences, analysts can combine 
these guidelines with the broader data set regarding the group (collected in Step 2) and their 
existing knowledge base and produce inferences about the unanswered questions.432 
Illustrative example: In considering the resources factor, I need to find information on 
the group’s level of financial resources. This information is unavailable, so I proceed to 
the Factor Influences List: Resources. After reading this list, I note that groups that have 
state sponsors usually have relatively high financial resources available. Since I know 
from my general research of the group that this group has a state sponsor, I can infer 
that their financial resources are considerable. 
c) Once an answer or inference has been obtained for as many of the listed questions as possible, 
analysts can proceed to the “flowchart” section of the factor analysis. The flowchart section 
supplies guidance for proceeding, depending on the data. For example, the flowchart might 
recommend increasing or decreasing A or C, restarting the analysis under different initial 
conditions or limiting the target space. The flowcharts have been produced using a combination 
of the results in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and will only be annotated where results are particularly 
speculative or counterintuitive.  
d) The analyst should record on the worksheet any changes suggested by the analysis of that 
factor and move on to the next factor. 
 
Step 4: Determination of Intent 
 
Once the factor analysis has been completed and all (or most) of the factors besides the Operational 
Objectives and Target Selection Process (consisting of Preliminary Target Selection, Surveillance and 
Final Target Selection) have been considered, the analyst should move to the Determination of Intent 
step of the framework where the various factor influences are combined and the target space evaluated 
to arrive at a determination of the existence and strength of the group’s motivation to attack a critical 
infrastructure target.  































































If the answer to either of these questions is affirmative, there is a presumption of intent, and the rest of the 
framework becomes unnecessary.  
 
In the majority of cases, however, there will be no direct evidence indicating the intent to attack critical 
infrastructure; in fact, one of the difficulties of counterterrorism is that often little is known about a group’s 
planning beyond “they are dangerous and want to hurt us.”  
 
This then leads us to the next step. 
 
 
• Is there evidence that the group is planning to attack critical infrastructure in the short 
to medium term? This could include a communiqué expressly announcing such 
intentions or intelligence (from an informant, intercepted signal etc.) indicating active 
planning to attack critical infrastructure. 
 
• Has the group attacked or made serious attempts to attack critical infrastructure in 









Master Data Requirements List 
 
1. How long has the group existed in its current form (i.e. as a separate organization)? 
2. How many generations of members has the group had? 
3. What is the observed ideology of the group (including worldview, grand strategic aims and the nature 
of the perceived enemy)? 
4. What is the group’s attitude towards human casualties? 
5. Which historic events hold symbolic relevance for the group? 
6. Is there any evidence of a specific dominant operational objective?  
7. What is the size of the group (active members)? 
8. Is the organizational structure more centralized (collected in a single geographic region) or more 
diffuse (for instance, cells scattered over several countries)? 
9. Who makes targeting decisions in the group? (autocratic single leader, consultative council, sub-
commanders etc.) 
10. Does the decision making style tend to be autocratic or consensual? 
11. To what extent are leadership decisions carried out? 
12. What is the status and position of various factions within the group? 
13. What are the demographic characteristics of key group decision makers, especially in terms of 
education, vocation, and family background? 
14. Do any key group decision makers exhibit clear symptoms of psychopathologies that could lead to 
perceptual impairment? 
15. Is there evidence that group decision makers habitually exhibit particular cognitive or affect-based 
biases? If so, which biases dominate and how do these tend to manifest? 
16. What is the general level of the group’s financial resources? 
17. How stable/dependable are current sources of financial resources and what is the cost to the group 
to obtain them? 
18. What kinds and amounts of physical resources (weapons, equipment, vehicles, etc.) does the group 
possess? 
19. How expansive and sophisticated is the group’s logistical infrastructure?  
a. Do they have access to safehouses, secure communications, travel documents and so 
forth?  
b. What amount of redundancy is built into the logistics system? 
20. What type of security environment does the group face at the time of target selection? 
21. How vulnerable is the group to detection, infiltration and elimination by the security forces of their 
opponents? 
22. Do group decision makers have a set timetable for action? 
23. Does the group currently perceive itself to be under threat? 
24. What is the group’s history of innovation (both tactically and technically)? 
25. What is the group’s general technological level? 
26. What is the group’s knowledge level of various critical infrastructure targets (e.g. through an insider 
at a nuclear power plant, or someone trained as a roadway engineer)? 
27. How familiar is the group with the general target environment? 
28. Which external groups or organizations do the terrorist decision makers perceive as allies or 
potential allies? 
a. Of these, the support of which external groups or organizations do they seek to gain or 
maintain? 
29. Which external groups do the terrorist decision makers perceive as opponents? 
30. What is the level of publicity terrorists expect from different media groupings? 
31. What does the group perceive the functionality of various targets to be and the consequences they 
expect from a successful attack against a target that falls within the CI category? 
32. How has the media recently portrayed critical infrastructure? 
33. What is the level of protection decision makers perceive CI targets in general (relative to other 
targets) or particular CI targets of interest, to have? 
34. What is the level of publicity they expect to receive by attacking various targets? 
35. How tolerant are decision makers about risk (in terms of operational success, group survivability and 




Step 3: Factor Analysis 
 












[This factor is relatively invariant DURING the decision making process] 
 
If data exists for the above questions, proceed to flowchart. Otherwise, derive inferences from Factor Influences 











• What is the observed ideology of the group (including worldview, grand 
strategic aims and the nature of the perceived enemy)? 
 
• What is the group’s attitude towards human casualties? 
 




Factor Influence List: Ideology 
 
Organizational Dynamics affecting Ideology 
 There is no evidence in the literature surveyed to indicate that organizational dynamics impacts ideology. 
 Hypothesis: Breakaway factions from terrorist groups are generally more ideologically radical (and thus are 
also often more prone to violence) than their parent organizations. 
 
Demographics affecting Ideology 
 According to Hoffman, the underlying focal point of terrorism is action and, even more, “the thrill and heady 
excitement that accompanies it.”  This implies that underlying psychological needs – in this case a craving for 
excitement – precede and condition ideological rationales.435 [Evidence Type: 3] 
 Hypothesis: In cases where decision making is dominated by a psychopathic or sociopathic personality, there 
is a smaller probability of constraints on causing multiple casualties.  
 Hypothesis: Education may influence ideology in that groups whose key members are better educated are 
likely to espouse more sophisticated doctrines.  
 Hypothesis: Education is likely to affect ideology in that members of terrorist groups have either been 
inculcated with the dominant world views in their own societies or are consciously rebelling against them.  For 
example, in parts of the world where religious instruction is included as an integral part of the educational 
curriculum, this may be a key source, implicitly or explicitly, of the ideology of members of terrorist groups.   
 
External Relations affecting Ideology 
 For nationalist and separatist groups, Cameron argues that since the support of a “natural constituency” is 
crucial for them, they are “much more likely to be moderate in their actions because that support is 
conditional.”436 The implication is that such groups are less likely to resort to extreme violence and 
indiscriminate targeting. [Evidence type: 1] 
 Parachini notes that societal alienation was a factor in shaping the worldviews of the perpetrators of several 
mass casualty incidents, and that their very alienation from society was in part responsible for the fact that they 
were not constrained by the usual societal norms against violence. 437 [Evidence Type: 3] 
 Those terrorist groups that rely heavily (either ideologically or logistically) on external support - especially from 
sympathizers or a perceived constituency such as the general public, but also from other criminal/extremist 
groups, etc. - will usually (but not always) limit their violent actions to what these external groups will find 
tolerable. They will at least take the impact of their actions on outside groups into account when deciding upon 
their operational objectives.438 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Historical Events affecting Ideology 
 McCormick argues that historical precedents, including prior practices – which he characterizes as “the 
(interpreted) experiences of…predecessors” – serve as “attractive guides” for terrorist action.439   
[Evidence Type: 2] 
 
Perceptual Filter affecting Ideology 
 The perceptual filter is not only affected by a group’s ideology, but can exert a reciprocal, although often more 
subtle, influence on a group’s ideology. In this case, the constant framing of incoming information usually 
serves to reinforce and intensify existing ideological beliefs in that counterfactual information is mostly 
excluded or distorted to reflect existing beliefs about good and evil, the nature of the enemy and the 
righteousness of the group’s ultimate goals. Depending on the strength of the perceptual filter (determined 
inter alia by the structural control of information to and within the group and the degree of social isolation of 
group members), this can lead to a vicious cycle in which existing beliefs influence the interpretation of outside 
events, which in turn further entrench or exacerbate these beliefs. 
 





















[This factor is relatively invariant DURING the decision making process] 
 
If data exists for the above questions, proceed to flowchart. Otherwise, derive inferences from Factor Influences 













                                                 
440 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc, 1998), p. 80. 
441 Ibid. 
• What is the size of the group (active members)? 
 
• Is the organizational structure more centralized (in a single geographic region, 




Factor Influence List: Organizational Structure 
 
General 
 Drake states that group size directly affects the formality of a terrorist organization’s internal structure.  
Specifically, small groups are more likely to operate with loose, informal structures.  Larger groups, however, 
are more likely to develop formal bureaucratic structures.442 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 Drake also suggests that group geography also influences an organization’s structure.  A group that has 
members that live close together is more likely to be able to operate efficiently with a less organized 
bureaucracy, than one that has its members spread over a wider area.443 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Ideology affecting Organizational Structure: 
 There is no evidence in the literature surveyed to indicate that ideology impacts organizational structure. 
 Hypothesis: Ideology may well affect a particular terrorist group’s organizational structure, e.g., groups with 
radically anti-authoritarian political agendas are arguably likely to adopt less authoritarian, centralized, and 
hierarchical organizations. 
 
Organizational Dynamics affecting Organizational Structure 
 Post comments that leadership style affects the structure of a terrorist organization.  Leaders with authoritarian, 
charismatic, narcissistic, paranoid and totalitarian personalities – in particular – are presented as types of 
individuals who will seek to create situations in which they can exert strong central control over their 
organizations (i.e. higher centralization).444 [Evidence Type: 2/4] 
 
Operational Capabilities affecting Organizational Structure 
 Sinai alludes to the fact that terrorist organizations’ operational capabilities may influence their structure.  
Specifically, as the technical capabilities of a terrorist group become increasingly specialized and sophisticated, 
its organizational structure may become increasingly diversified and compartmentalized into specialist units 
(i.e. elements that work with finances, recruitment, public relations, military operations, etc.).445  
[Evidence Type: 3] 
 
External Relations affecting Organizational Structure: 
 Silke points out that there is an influence on the Organizational Structure of a group when there is a 
sympathetic or supporting group involved, as evidenced by internal rules designed to foster and maintain 
support among what are seen as constituents.446 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Security Environment affecting Organizational Structure 
 Muller suggests that the security environment may influence groups’ tendencies toward hierarchical and 
command-oriented structures – the harsher a security environment the more centralized decision-making is 
likely to become to maximize offensive capabilities and survival.  (Note this does not preclude the use of cells 
for security purposes.)447  [Evidence Type: 1] 
 














Life-Cycle affecting Organizational Structure  
 Thomas and Jackson 448  suggest that terrorist organizations progress through certain “life-cycles.”  The 
maturity of an organization, therefore, affects shifts in “internal functions” and “decision-making.”  Although 
Thomas449 identifies this as a process, he doesn’t provide specific examples of how the life-cycle impacts 
structure.  Jackson suggests that older organizations become increasingly complex and have time to develop 
larger, more extensive and complex networks.  [Evidence Type: 2]  
 
Operational Objectives affecting Organizational Structure 
 Hypothesis: operational objectives can influence the long-term structure of an organization, especially if these 
objectives prescribe a sophisticated operation.  In such a case, a group’s structure might become increasingly 
specialized in order to meet the needs of a complex operation. This would only make sense for the group 
under a single attack planning process, if the operation is large, complex and will have high-impact effects. 
 
 


















[This factor is relatively invariant DURING the decision making process] 
 
Note: Organizational dynamics, while important in many areas of terrorist study, have very little direct impact on 
analyzing target selection, and even less impact on the decision between a CI and non-CI target. Organizational 
dynamics are, however, extremely relevant in determining the structure of the analysis. If data exists for the 
above questions, proceed to flowchart. Otherwise, derive inferences from Factor Influences List (following page) 




• Who makes targeting decisions in the group? (autocratic single leader, 
consultative council, sub-commanders etc.?) 
• Does the decision making style tend to be autocratic or consensual? 
• To what extent are leadership decisions carried out? 




Factor Influence List: Organizational Dynamics 
 
Historical Events affecting Organizational Dynamics  
 McCormick suggests that historical events set the stage for the development of certain internal group 
dynamics.  Specifically, he notes that the “frustration-aggression” hypothesis posits that a group’s move toward 
violence can often be the result of a discrepancy between expectations and achievement.450   
[Evidence Type: 2]   
 
Ideology affecting Organizational Dynamics 
 There is no evidence in the literature surveyed to indicate that ideology impacts organizational dynamics. 
 Hypothesis: Whenever terrorist groups alter aspects of their doctrines, methods or objectives, this almost 
always leads to a process of factionalization or internal schism. Since many organizations undergo schisms or 
break apart after adopting even relatively small doctrinal changes, it may well be that an unpopular ideological 
shift will contribute  to the dissolution of an organization.   
 
Demographics affecting Organizational Dynamics  
 McCormick suggests that various ideological, social and demographic factors, including access to family and 
friends, social cohesion, costs of internal defiance, and the ability to leave the group, affect the internal 
dynamics of a group.  Specifically, the more closely bound by common demographic factors and the more 
insular a group, the more likely its members are to act cooperatively.451 [Evidence Type: 2] 
 Hypothesis: In terms of psychological health, clinically unstable decision makers (such as sociopathic 
personalities) may be less likely to be bound by ideological and other constraints and more likely to have 
punitive objectives. 
 
External Relations affecting Organizational Dynamics 
 Silke points out that there is an influence on the organizational dynamics of a group when there is a 
sympathetic or supporting group involved, as evidenced by internal rules designed to foster and maintain 
support among what are seen as constituents.452 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
General Planning Characteristics affecting Organizational Dynamics 
 Hypothesis: A short perceived time horizon (brought about, for instance, by an increasingly oppressive security 
environment) can result in increased stress levels that can have an impact on group dynamics.     
 















Note: The literature neither posited nor implied a direct link between any specific demographic factors and 
attacks on critical infrastructure. However, the following hypothesis is offered. 
 
Hypothesis: If a key decision maker has a background or expertise related to any type of critical infrastructure 
(for instance, if the leader is a civil engineer), this increases the attractiveness of that critical infrastructure as a 
target. 
 
If data exists for the above questions, proceed to flowchart. Otherwise, derive inferences from Factor Influences 










• What are the demographic characteristics of key group decision makers, 




Factor Influence List: Demographics 
 
Ideology affecting Demographics 
There is no evidence in the literature surveyed to indicate that ideology impacts demographic factors. 
Hypothesis: It is likely that different types of ideologies appeal to different types of people and therefore attract 
different kinds of recruits.  For example, more sophisticated doctrines tend to appeal to better educated people, 
and vice versa. 
 
Historical Events affecting Demographics 
There is no supporting evidence in the literature surveyed to indicate that historical events impact demographic 
factors. 
Hypothesis: certain historical events in which adverse events occurred could have a negative impact on terrorists 
of certain age groups (e.g. ages 30-60 years), influencing their decision to join a terrorist group and also making 
them more likely to attack specific types of infrastructure related to or connected with the adverse historical event. 
 
Life-cycle stage affecting Demographics 
Hoffmann contends that successor generations of a terrorist group or cause tend to be less idealistic and more 
ruthless, and may even become expressive.453 [Evidence Type: 3] 
 
 






















If data exists for the above questions, proceed to the general capabilities framework in target selection. 
Otherwise, derive inferences to inform the above questions from the Factor Influences List (following page) and 







• What is the general level of the group’s financial resources? 
 
• How stable/dependable are current sources of financial resources and what is 
the cost to the group to obtain them? 
 
• What kinds and amounts of physical resources (weapons, equipment, 
vehicles, etc.) does the group possess? 
 
• How expansive and sophisticated is the group’s logistical infrastructure? Do 
they have access to safehouses, secure communications, travel documents 




Factor Influence List: Resources 
 
Ideology affecting Resources 
 There is no evidence in the literature to indicate that ideology impacts resources. 
 Hypothesis: Less ideologically radical groups may in many cases be able to acquire or develop more 
resources because their goals are likely to appeal to a broader audience and thereby engender the provision 
of more external assistance. 
 
Organizational Structure affecting Resources 
 Although not specifically mentioned in the literature, it appears to be common sense that larger groups will 
have access to greater resources – in terms of financial, physical, logistical and human.  Bigger groups will 
require more funding to operate, and they will also have more resources to commit toward increasing their 
funding and other resources.  This could be supported by the arguments advanced by Drake 454  and 
Jackson.455  
 
Demographics and Operational Capabilities affecting Resources 
 The logistics network and support systems that an organization sets up for long term as well as short term 
(attack specific) operations is determined by the demographics of the group as well as organizational structure. 
456,457 [Evidence Type: 2,3,4] 
 The effectiveness with which the material resources a group possesses in terms of weapons and equipment 
are used is determined by the operational capability and human resources of a group.458 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 Those groups with members from higher socio-economic strata are more likely to have greater financial and 
other resources. 
 
External Relations affecting Resources 
 State sponsorship of terrorism has infused some terrorist groups with greater resources such as money, 
sophisticated munitions, intelligence and technical expertise allowing them to contemplate operations larger 
and more lethal than they would have without state sponsorship.  This also removes the constraint of playing 
to populations for support.459,460 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 State sponsorship of terrorist groups has long been appreciated as a source of advanced weapons 
technology.461 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 Hoffman identifies state sponsorship with increased capabilities, which could lead to undertaking more 
ambitious operations.462 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 “Increasingly, terrorist organizations are looking to criminal activity and specifically the drug trade as a source 
of funding. The FARC in Colombia are but one of many cases in point.”463 [Evidence Type: 3]  
 
Security Environment affecting Resources 
 Globalization and a less-regulated environment have allowed terrorists to develop their financial resources.464 
[Evidence Type: 1] 
 
 



















Critical Infrastructure Characteristics affecting Resources 
 CI characteristics can influence a terrorist organization’s need to acquire new resources in that the nature of 
certain types of CI necessitates a certain level of resources for an attack to be successful. Jackson asserts in 
this regard that the acquisition of new technology by terrorist groups enhances their ability to attack well 
defended targets.465 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Operational Objectives affecting Resources 
 Once terrorists have determined their general operational objectives, they may find that they lack the requisite 
resources to engage in the type of attack that would give them the effects they seek. This can (but not 
necessarily will) prompt the group to build up their resources to the levels and types required to perpetrate the 
desired type of attack. The extra resources can be achieved through, inter alia, purchase, theft, indigenous 
development466 or transfer from an external supporter. 
 
Target Selection affecting Resources 
 Hypothesis: If a group not only “attacks” CI, but steals from it as well, its resources will grow.  Moreover, the 
more CI attacked, the greater is the non-state actor’s knowledge of CI targets. 
 
Attack Modalities affecting Resources  
 As attack modalities become more complex, the resources and operational capability needed to conduct the 
attack increase in complexity.467 [Evidence Type: 1,3] Hypothesis: This can drive the accumulation of greater 
amounts and more varied kinds of resources. 
 
Life-Cycle affecting Resources 
 Hypothesis: Although the majority of terrorist groups do not survive longer than a decade, for those groups that 
persevere for any length of time, it is likely (barring counterterrorist actions to limit this) that the mechanisms 
for acquiring resources (such as weapons suppliers) will become more regularized, and financial and other 
resources will accumulate.  























If data exists for the above questions, proceed to flowchart. Otherwise, derive inferences from Factor Influences 










• What is the group’s history of innovation (both tactically and technically)? 
 
• What is the group’s general technological level? 
 
• What is the group’s knowledge level of various critical infrastructure targets 
(e.g. through an insider at a nuclear power plant, or someone trained as an 
roadway engineer)? 
 





Factor Influence List: Operational Capabilities 
 
Ideology affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Jackson argues that the “philosophical and ideological views of a group – including both the espoused 
philosophy of the organization and the ‘actual’ philosophy revealed by the group’s actions – are also critical in 
determining whether it will seek out new technology.” Thus, ideology ostensibly plays a role in a terrorist 
group’s degree of technological innovation. [Evidence Type: 3]468 
 
Organizational Structure affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Jackson uses organizational theory to argue that group structure can influence technological innovation within 
a terrorist group.  Those groups that are cell-based and largely “leaderless” will have more difficulty 
implementing new technology adoption than will organizations that allow more face-to-face interaction.469  
[Evidence Type: 1,2,4]  
 Jackson also states that the size of a group will affect its technical expertise.  He notes that the larger an 
organization, the more likely it is to have members that possess the explicit and tacit knowledge base 
necessary to efficiently absorb and make use of new technologies.470 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 Drake asserts that a group’s size affects its operational capabilities.  He notes that a larger organization is 
more likely to have a richer collection of skills and resources that will enable it to conduct more complex 
operations.471  [Evidence Type: 1]  
 Drake also suggests that organization size can impact a group’s knowledge of CI targets.  Specifically, larger 
groups will have the manpower to collect more information about potential targets, enhancing their ability to 
select good targets which can be effectively attacked.472  [Evidence Type: 1]  
 
Organizational Dynamics affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Jackson points out that “groups led by individuals who are open to new technology” are much more likely to 
innovate than groups led by individuals hostile to new technology.473  [Evidence Type: 1]  
 
Demographics affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Capabilities, experience, tacit knowledge, and training of members have an effect on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the group’s operational capability.474 [Evidence Type: 3] 
 Hypothesis: Socio-economic status, education levels, family background, previous incarceration and 
substance abuse will all affect the efficiency of the group by influencing the inherent operational capabilities of 
the members. For instance, the more “worldly” one is the more one might have had experiences with, or an 
introduction to, a greater variety of targets than one who is rural, poor and uneducated. 
 Hypothesis: terrorists who have live or been educated in the U.S. may have a clearer understanding of CI 
locations, access, vulnerability and characteristics; thus, those terrorists could potentially have insider 
knowledge which could aid and abet in operational planning procedures for future terrorist attacks. 
 
Resources affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Access to resources, especially weaponry, has increased terrorist operational capabilities.475  
[Evidence Type: 3] 
 “Off-the-shelf weapons” and improvised explosive devices using commonly available materials have been 
adapted by terrorists to successfully carry out operations. This has reduced the need to pursue more 
sophisticated weapons. 476  [Evidence Type: 3] According to Hoffman, “unconventional adaptations and 
modifications to conventional devices” have given terrorists the ability to carry out effective operations.477 
[Evidence Type: 3] 














 Internal and external motivations to innovate increase the technological resources an organization has at its 
disposal.478 [Evidence Type: 1] This increases the technical expertise of an organization, which is part of its 
operational capability.  
 Experience, tacit knowledge, and training of members have an effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
group’s operational capability.479 [Evidence Type: 3] 
 State-sponsorship gives terrorist groups access to resources that allows them greater operational 
capabilities.480 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 The logistics network and support systems that an organization sets up for long term as well as short term 
(attack specific) operations influence the operational capabilities as well as the resources of the group. This 
relationship is fundamental in understanding the transference of resources to operational capability. 481 
[Evidence Type: 2,3,4] 
 
External Relations affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Hoffman482 [Evidence Type 1] identifies state sponsorship with increased capabilities which could lead to 
undertaking more ambitious operations. Jenkins483 [Evidence Type 1] states that state sponsorship of terrorism 
has infused some terrorist groups with greater resources such as money, sophisticated munitions, intelligence 
and technical expertise, allowing them to contemplate operations larger and more lethal484 [Evidence Type 1] 
than they would have without state sponsorship.  This also removes the constraint of playing to populations for 
support.  
 International cooperation between extremist and criminal groups can influence the transfer of expertise and 
tacit knowledge that leads to an increased operational capability.485 [Evidence Type 1] 
 
Historical Events affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Advances in information technology and the exchange of information have allowed terrorists to propagate 
successful attack techniques and tools. This medium of accelerated knowledge transfer has reduced the need 
for training and increased the operational capability of terrorists.486 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Security Environment affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Globalization and a less-regulated environment have allowed terrorists to develop their financial resources and 
operational capabilities.487 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 On the other hand, Drake notes that the security environment can restrict a terrorist group’s strategy and 
operational capability and that it is difficult for terrorists to operate in a totalitarian or authoritarian state.488 
[Evidence Type: 1,2] 
 Terrorist groups are sometimes motivated to adopt new technology and innovate operational techniques 
because of changes in the security environment. When the operational capability of a terrorist group has been 
limited by the security environment, terrorists will adapt to employing unsophisticated low-level attacks on soft 
targets. 489  [Evidence Type: 1] Terrorists will identify and innovate attack techniques to exploit new 
vulnerabilities when faced with security environments and countermeasures that nullify existing techniques.490 
[Evidence Type: 3] The resulting competition between terrorists and counterterrorism efforts leads to a 
“technological treadmill” with each group trying to outdo the other.491 [Evidence Type: 2,3] 



















Life Cycle affecting Operational Capabilities 
 Hypothesis: As a group matures, and gains organizational experience, at least some of its capabilities tend to 
increase (for example, familiarity with target society and specialized skills). 
 
Operational Objectives affecting Operational Capabilities  
 According to both Bruce Hoffman and Brian Jackson, terrorists display a tendency towards operational 
conservatism, generally relying more on imitation of their own or others’ past successes than innovation of new 
techniques and technologies.492 [Evidence Type: 1] They tend to use the same tactics and “off-the-shelf” 
weapons493 (albeit often cleverly modified to suit their needs) that they have used for the past half-century. 
Terrorists usually INNOVATE or pursue a new TECHNOLOGY LEVEL only when they are forced to or feel 
they will receive unique gains by doing so. The impetus for this change, according to Jackson, can come from 
the group’s operational objectives in the following ways: 
o He argues that groups wanting to dramatically escalate the scale and lethality of their attacks to 
have a greater punitive or coercive effect may be forced to adopt new weapons and 
technologies494 [Evidence Type 1]. 
o Groups can feel the need to embrace technologies for ORGANIZATION BUILDING reasons.495 
[Evidence Type: 1] 
 Hypothesis: The type of attack desired (for example, an attack in the heartland of the enemy) may also 
account for a move to become more familiar with the target society. This could also lead to an increase in a 
group’s networking capabilities if it required the assistance of external actors to accomplish any of the above 
tasks. 
 
Attack Modalities affecting Operational Capabilities 
 As attack modalities become more complex, the resources and operational capability needed to conduct the 
attack increase in complexity.496 [Evidence Type: 1,3] 
 
Perceptual Filter affecting Operational Capabilities 
 No direct indications in the literature surveyed that perceptual filter affects operational capabilities, although 
cognitive and affect-based biases, if sufficiently powerful, are hypothesized to negatively influence such 
aspects of operational capabilities as the transfer of tacit knowledge in the technology and skill acquisition 
process, the extent to which the group can become familiar with a different culture and the ability to 
successfully network and coordinate with allies. 
 




























If data exists for the above questions, proceed to the flowchart. Otherwise, derive inferences from Factor 
Influences List (following the figures on the next page) and then return to the flowchart. Each segment of the 














There is of course always the risk of discovery.       
   
                                                 
497 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context,” p. 84. [Evidence Type 1]   
• Which external groups or organizations do the terrorist decision makers 
perceive as allies or potential allies? 
• Of these, the support of which external groups or organizations do they seek 
to gain or maintain? 
• Which external groups do the terrorist decision makers perceive as 
opponents? 
• What is the level of publicity terrorists expect from different media groupings? 










* Stemming from the imitative nature of terrorist attacks, terrorists may be spurred on by the success of a similar attack by 
another group. The strength of the increase in attractiveness will depend on several factors, including the degree of success 
of the previous attack and whether the group under consideration feels it must compete or outdo the perpetrators of the 
earlier attack. There is “a widely shared expectation that terrorists will return to targets whose importance (and vulnerability) 
has already been demonstrated” (Baruch Fischhoff, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, Jennifer S. Lerner, “Judged 
Terror Risk and Proximity to the World Trade Center,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26:2/3 (2003), p. 138). 
 
** By drawing attention to critical infrastructure, the media makes this target more attractive to the group. It may also 
increase the group’s perceived capability by imparting information about the infrastructure that the group perceives as 
useful in conducting a successful attack. Drake observes that terrorists are less likely to attack targets that are less known 






Factor Influence List: External Relations 
 
Ideology affecting External Relations 
 Hypothesis: Groups espousing ideologies with more widespread appeal and a large constituency will be more 
likely to acquire a greater number of supporters and sympathizers.  
 
Resources affecting External Relations: 
 Thomas498 uses systems theory to describe the effect of logistical resources on external relations, “…The 
support subsystem works at the boundary of the violent non-state actor (VNSA), exchanging energy, 
monitoring and managing relations with the environment. Five types of environmental transactions are most 
critical to the VNSA; recruiting, resource acquisition, stakeholder associations, intelligence gathering and 
product delivery.” [Evidence Type: 2, 4]. This implies that poor logistical resources will hamper external 
relations of all types. 
 
Operational Capabilities affecting External Relations 
 Hypothesis: The lack of sufficient internal operational capabilities may force a group to look for external 
assistance, making it more likely to want to please its allies.   
 
Historical Events affecting External Relations 
 Hypothesis: If a terrorist group’s ideology addresses events that are historically significant and/or traumatic for 
a large population, it is likely that the group will have a larger pool of supporters and perceived potential 
supporters.  
 
Security Environment affecting External Relations 
 Hypothesis: A more oppressive security environment may a) make it more difficult for terrorists to interact with 
external parties, such as supporters or the media; and b) make the group more dependent on the assistance 
of external actors. 
 
Life Cycle affecting External Relations 
 There is no evidence in the literature surveyed to indicate that life cycle affects external relations. 
 Hypothesis: Well-established groups are more likely to have a greater number and variety of external relations 
than fledgling terrorist groups. 
 
Target Selection affecting External Relations 
 Clearly the targets that are selected will have ramifications with one’s constituents and the public at large, but 
this only occurs after the action has been taken, and so is unlikely to influence external relations DURING the 
target selection process.  
 


















This is a vital element of the analysis. If data exists for the above questions, proceed to further factor analyses. 






































 What is the level of protection decision makers perceive CI targets in general 
(relative to other targets) or particular CI targets of interest, to have? 
 
 What does the group perceive the functionality of the target to be and the 
consequences they expect from a successful attack against the CI target?* 
 





Factor Influence List: Critical Infrastructure Characteristics 
 
Since the characteristics of critical infrastructure are exogenous factors, rarely dependent on anything 
the group does DURING the decision process, there are no direct group factors that can influence target 
selection. However, the general security environment can affect the critical infrastructure directly, and 
of course, several factors influence the terrorist group’s perception of these CI characteristics.  These 
latter factors are dealt with during the ‘target selection’ phase of the analysis. 
 
Security Environment affecting Critical Infrastructure (CI) Characteristics 
 It is commonsense that the general security environment is linked to the level of target protection. As general 
alert levels and security measures increase, it can be assumed that the protection around many targets will 
increase. A heightened security alert status will in most circumstances lead to better protection measures 
around CI facilities that are not as highly guarded under less threatening circumstances. However, this will 
not necessarily be the case (since the actual implementation of specific measures is dependent on several 

















This element of the analysis has no direct effect on target selection, but may influence other factors. If data 
exists for the above questions, nothing need be done. If not, inferences from the Factor Influences List (following) 
can be derived in order to inform other areas of the framework. 
 Do group decision makers have a set timetable for action? 
 
 How tolerant are decision makers about risk (in terms of operational success, group 




Factor Influence List: General Planning Characteristics 
 
Ideology affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 Nothing in the literature surveyed indicates a relation between the ideology of a terrorist group and the general 
planning characteristics for an attack. 
 Hypothesis: Ideology can affect both a terrorist group’s time horizon and risk tolerance. Certain ideologies, for 
instance, that of an apocalyptic cult, may set a timetable for action that gives decision-makers a limited time 
horizon. Other ideologies, especially in terms of the value they place on group member’s lives and the notion 
of ‘sacrifice’, may make a group more or less tolerant of risk. 
  
Organizational Dynamics affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 Nothing in the literature surveyed indicates a relation between the organizational dynamics of a terrorist group 
and the general planning characteristics for an attack. 
 Hypothesis: Intra-group dynamics can impose perceived deadlines, for instance a challenge to the leadership 
may make the existing leader perceive that an operation is needed more urgently.  
 
Operational Capabilities affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 Nothing in the literature surveyed indicates a relation between the operational capabilities of a terrorist group 
and the general planning characteristics for an attack. However, the operational capabilities possessed by the 
group are likely an important factor in the group’s assessment of time requirements and the risks associated 
with a particular attack. 
 
CI Characteristics affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 Nothing in the literature surveyed indicates a relation between the characteristics of potential CI targets and 
the general planning characteristics for an attack. 
 It can be argued, however, that terrorists consider the characteristics of the target in performing risk 
assessment and evaluating the time requirements for an attack. For instance, a facility that is in the process of 
increasing its level of protection may prompt terrorists to consider attacking the facility before the increased 
security is in place. 
 
Historical Events affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 Post describes triggering events as events which lead a group to believe that the only course of action involves 
violence.  Some triggering events may increase the risk of terrorism.  [Evidence Type: 1]501 
 Pynchon adroitly describes the effects of historical events on the perceived time horizon of decision makers: 
“Situational changes may increase a group’s sense of urgency.  A heightened sense of urgency may increase 
the propensity for violence…”502 
 Hypothesis: Terrorist attacks often occur (as a retaliatory or punitive measure) on the anniversary of an event 
which the group perceives as an adverse historical event. This can impose time constraints on decisions.  
 
Security Environment affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 Hypothesis: A more oppressive security environment increases the group’s perception of threat and therefore 
may narrow their perceived window for planning and action. 
 
Perceptual Filter affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 The perceptual filter is closely linked to risk tolerance and decision maker time horizon, since these factors will 
be affected by any perceptual distortions that may be operating.503 
 
 









Operational Objectives affecting General Planning Characteristics 
 The specific operational objectives set by the group during the attack planning process can have an obvious 
and direct effect on the decision maker’s time horizon, in that certain of these objectives may be time-
dependent. An illustrative example is the case where a decision maker wants to act to increase recruitment 
relative to a rival group – if he delays too long, the competitor may induct the best personnel from among the 
pool of available recruits and the objective of increasing recruitment may remain unfulfilled no matter how 
successful the attack ultimately turns out to be. 
 Joshua Sinai describes the different incubation periods associated with different types of attack and asserts 
that high-impact conventional and CBRN attacks generally require longer incubation periods than low-impact 
conventional attacks.504 [Evidence Type: 3] 
 Drake mentions that in certain cases, once a group decides on a general category of targets, they will attack 


































 Do any key group decision makers exhibit clear symptoms of psychopathologies 
that could lead to perceptual impairment? 
 
 Is there evidence that group decision makers habitually exhibit particular cognitive 





Factor Influence List: Perceptual Filter 
 
Ideology affecting Perceptual Filter 
 Hypothesis: At least some portion of the various ‘frames’ through which information is processed is determined 
by the ideology, particularly the worldview, of the group. For example, a group whose ideology is religiously 
based may define another religious group as irretrievably corrupt enemies of god and therefore any actions by 
this enemy, however benign or logical, will be perceived as stemming from, and confirming, his evil. 
 
Historical Events affecting Perceptual Filter 
 Hypothesis: Similarly to the mechanisms by which historical events can impact a group’s ideology, they can 
also influence the way in which group decision makers interpret information, particularly that flowing from the 
outside world. Thus traumatic events in the lives of decision makers can bias their perceptions of the 
information they receive. 
 
Demographics affecting Perceptual Filter 
 Hypothesis: A correlation can be made between psychological health and perceptions. Psychologically 
unstable individuals within a terrorist group will perceive things differently than normal, stable individuals.  
 
Security Environment affecting Perceptual Filter 
 An increasingly oppressive security environment can place group members under prohibitive levels of stress 
and can exacerbate existing perceptual impediments. 
 
General Planning Characteristics affecting Perceptual Filter 
 Pynchon describes how the perceived time horizon of decision makers can affect the perceptual filters through 
which information passes to decision makers: “Situational changes may increase a group’s sense of urgency.  
A heightened sense of urgency may increase the propensity for violence by 1) increasing the likelihood of 
irrational reaction to a triggering event, [and] 2) increasing the likelihood of “flawed decision-making” re 
targeted violence...”506 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Life Cycle affecting Perceptual Filter 
 The perceptual filter of the group will undoubtedly change during the group’s lifetime, as decision makers 
change and external and internal events shape the cognitive outlook of the group. It is extremely difficult to 
predict the direction of these changes, whether, as Hoffmann implies507, affect-based distortions become more 
pronounced, or, conversely, that new leadership structures emerge with fewer information processing biases. 
 
Demographics affecting Perceptual Filter 
 There is no supporting evidence in the literature to indicate that demographic factors impact perceptual filters.  
 Hypothesis: a correlation can be made between age and perceptions, as different age groups will have 
different perceptions; which may ultimately affect their operational planning methods. 
 Hypothesis: Psychologically ill decision makers may experience cognitive impairment of various types. 









Step 4: Determination of Intent 
 

















Explanation [desired effect: hurt 
enemy] 
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assist terrorists’ own 
organization] 
 [to decrease the 
ability of the enemy 








 Weaken opponent’s 
will to oppose group 
goals (through fear) 




/ security forces 
I
1 b) Retaliation 
(retribution for recent 
perceived injury) 
 Draw attention to 
group’s cause 
P Boost internal 
morale* 
P Disrupt opponent’s 
military / security 
forces 
I
1 c) Eliminate Enemy 
Population 
I Show opponent to 






/ security forces 
I
  Disorient opponent P Increase external 
support* 
P   
  Provoke 
government 
backlash 
 Influence intragroup 
power relations* 
(reinforce status quo 
or bolster challenge) 




  False flag operation P     
Harm population 
(low-high) 
 Harm population 
(low-high) 
 Harm population 
(low-high) 






 Actions that 
threaten harm (low-
high) 
 Actions that 
threaten harm (low-
high) 




















  Disrupt 
infrastructure (low-




   
 













































































































































Factor Influence List: Operational Objectives 
 
Ideology affecting Operational Objectives 
 Most commentators would agree that ideology is a major (but not necessarily a determinative) causative factor 
in the effects terrorists seek to achieve through their attacks.  Drake posits that ideology influences an attack in 
a direct manner in that a group’s specific worldview can prescribe specific operational objectives. [Evidence 
Type: 3]515 Inference: Likewise, that worldview can proscribe certain objectives. 
 Drake also believes that a group’s ideology limits the set of legitimate targets terrorists are willing to consider, 
and it is this limited set that terrorists consider attacking in an effort to achieve their operational objectives.516 
[Evidence Type: 1] One example of this has to do with the terrorists’ attitudes towards causing human 
casualties. Parachini517 implies that certain worldviews lead to a specific desire to cause as many casualties as 
possible. [Evidence Type: 1] 
 Ideology does not have a determinative influence on operational objectives - in certain cases those objectives 
may stray out of the bounds set by the ideology (e.g., as per Drake’s formulation, when the perceived strategic 
benefits of eliciting a significant reaction from the psychological target outweigh certain ideological 
prohibitions518). [Evidence Type: 3]  
 The influence of ideology on operational objectives also depends on whether the terrorist group in question 
views violence as a means to an end or an end in itself [Evidence Type: 3]519 Hypothesis: When violence is 
regarded as a means to an end, the operational objectives of an attack are more likely to be constrained by the 
group’s overall ideology. However, in cases where a group’s ideology actually views death and destruction as 
a goal in and of itself (e.g. an apocalyptic cult), ideology is less likely to impose limits on operational objectives 
and may in fact expand the target options available to terrorists. 
 Hypothesis: ideology can affect admissible casualty levels in the following ways: 
o if low casualty levels are desired or tolerated, this will limit the range of targets 
o if high-casualty levels are tolerated, any target will be suitable 
o if high-casualty levels are desired, that too will limit the range of prospective targets 
 
Organizational Dynamics can affect Operational Objectives 
 Internal group pressures can affect the decision makers’ ability to articulate their operational objectives 
rationally.520 [Evidence Type: 1]. 
 Operational objectives may in general be bounded by ideological concerns, but in the short term – during a 
single attack process – these objectives will be interpreted and prioritized by key decision makers; therefore, if 
the leadership of a group changes, the new leaders may not have the same strategic outlook521 [Evidence 
Type: 3]. Post argues that LEADERSHIP STYLE – in particular, psychotic, narcissistic and paranoid leadership 
personalities – can affect the likelihood of groups to tend toward violence, in that the above-mentioned 
personality types may be prone to seeking increased levels of violence (including casualties). 522 [Evidence 
Type: 2]. Hypothesis: PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH – clinically unstable decision makers (such as sociopathic 
personalities) may be less likely to be bound by ideological and other constraints when looking at operational 
objectives; they may, in many cases, be more likely to act punitively in addition to fulfilling other goal types. 
 Severe FACTIONALIZATION or imminent splitting within a group can lead to more extreme operational 
objectives (and their subsequent retroactive endorsement), as per Drake, who states that actions by “more 
















violent or impetuous members of a group, can force the leadership to endorse such actions retrospectively for 
fear of losing the group’s internal cohesion or even splitting the organization.” 523  [Evidence Type: 1].   
 Hypothesis: in groups where FACTIONALIZATION occurs or is imminent, a ‘challenger’ faction may push for 
greater scale or more extreme desired effects than otherwise as part of a power play. Also, a ‘status quo’ 
faction may feel the need to increase the scale or effects of an attack in order to bolster their position within the 
group and undermine challengers. 
 
Resources affecting Operational Objectives 
 According to his definition of strategy 524 , Drake implies that terrorists take into account their available 
resources when deciding on a course of action. As previously mentioned, Drake’s construction differs 
somewhat from our conception of operational objectives. While it can be assumed that terrorists will keep their 
present resource levels in mind throughout the attack planning process, it is usually only at the stage of 
preliminary target selection, when they already have an idea of what they want to achieve by an attack, that 
resources (through the consideration of group capability) are explicitly accounted for. Operational objectives 
are therefore likely to have a much stronger influence on resource levels than the converse relationship. 
 
Operational Capabilities affecting Operational Objectives 
 Similar to the discussion regarding resources, while it can be assumed that existing operational capabilities will 
be borne in mind throughout the attack planning process, it is usually only at the stage of preliminary target 
selection, when terrorist decision makers already have an idea of what they want to achieve by an attack, that 
they explicitly consider their operational capabilities and resources (through the determination of group 
capability). Operational objectives will thus in the vast majority of cases exert more of an influence on 
operational capabilities than vice versa. 
 Hypothesis: a group possessing a technology, tactic, skill or weapon it feels is unique (such as expertise in 
skydiving), may become biased toward using this capability when deciding on operational objectives. 
 
External Relations affecting Operational Objectives 
 One of the first things to keep in mind is Jenkins’525 argument that the effect of violence on people watching the 
violent act (such as the general public or the government) is perhaps as important and maybe even more 
important than the physical damage inflicted.  [Evidence Type 1] 
 Hoffman526 indicates that although in many cases less spectacular attacks are considered by terrorists to be 
legitimate and acceptable as a means to influence the general public, the public can experience a level of 
desensitization where “typical” targets no longer garner the desired reaction and this drives the terrorists to 
more violent and dramatic acts to regain attention. [Evidence Type: 1] He states that “…for many other 
terrorists…equation of publicity and attention with success and self-gratification has the effect of locking them 
into an unrelenting upward spiral of violence in order to retain the media and public's attention…The effect is 
that terrorists today feel driven to undertake ever more dramatic and destructively lethal deeds in order to 
achieve the same effect that a less ambitious or bloody action may have had in the past.”527  
 Hoffman further contends528 in the case of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist organizations, that the more 
successful groups will be able to determine an effective level of violence that is at once 'tolerable' for the local 
populace, tacitly acceptable to international opinion and sufficiently modulated so as not to provoke massive 
governmental crackdown and reaction. [Evidence Type: 1] 
 Sinai argues that external relations – in particular, links with foreign groups and state sponsors – will affect an 
organizations willingness to attack.529 [Note: He does not specifically say how, but implies that the organization 
will act in a manner consistent with the norms of its constituency groups.]  Jackson presents a variation on this 
sentiment by arguing that some groups will make decisions to attack based on the need to achieve recognition 
and “respect” from external groups.530 [Evidence Type: 2] 














Historical Events affecting Operational Objectives 
 The Influence of Previous Attacks: 
o In general, past behavior has been shown to be a good (but by no means foolproof) guide to 
‘types’ of future behavior – as seen in the threat assessment of individual suspects (see 
Corcoran and Cawood).531 In assessing the likelihood that an individual may be involved in 
violent activities, Fein, Voseekuil, & Holden explain that it is important to know if the subject has 
expressed interest in particular targets, has attempted to harm self or others, has practiced with 
weapons, and has approached potential targets.532  Experience from the study of individual 
violence probably carries over to some degree to the context of a terrorist group.  
[Evidence Type: 1] 
o If previous attacks (targets, tactics, weapons etc.) are viewed by a group as successful, and 
they perceive such attacks will be successful in the future, this may encourage some groups to 
emulate these attacks; however, groups (especially those seeking to put themselves on the map 
or to outdo competitors) also may want to ‘do one better’ and escalate SCALE if not target type. 
A combination of the ideas of Nacos,533 Woo534 and Hoffmann535 supports this. 
o The notion of adaptive learning: Al-Qaeda seems to follow this, as per Woo: “Al Qaeda is eager 
to learn from past terrorist experience – the successes and failures of attacks perpetrated by its 
own network, and by other terrorists around the world.”536 
o People tend to overestimate past events in terms of success – this is a form of attribution bias 
and is described in Taleb.537 
 Relative Global Discrepancies: 
o A report of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans’ Affairs, and International Relations 
argues that the United States may continue to become a more desirable target due to continued 
economic, political, and military growth.538 [Evidence Type: 1]  
 






























 Trigger Events: 
o Post describes trigger events as events that lead a group to believe that the only course of 
action involves violence. An example of a triggering event is when group members or leaders 
are harmed by a regime or other opponent.539 [Evidence Type:0 2]  
o Hypothesis: the nature of the trigger event can lead to specific operational objectives, for 
example, the desire to regain legitimacy by causing casualties, or an increase in the desired 
scale of an attack. 
 
Security Environment affecting Operational Objectives 
 One opinion holds that when the operational capability of a terrorist group has been limited by the security 
environment, terrorists will adapt to employing unsophisticated low-level attacks on soft targets.540 [Evidence 
Type: 1] 
 On the other hand, Pynchon suggests that the security environment – specifically, the levels of vulnerability 
and threat a group feels – may be directly correlated to a terrorist group’s willingness to coalesce around more 
violent acts.541  [Evidence Type: 1]   
 Drake implies that external pressures on the group stemming from increased pressure from the security forces 
can influence the group’s choice of operational objectives, “the pressures connected with surviving [in this 
case external pressures] can distort terrorists’ ability to make rational decisions.” 542 
 Hypothesis: in certain cases (where groups are forced to hurry their planning or find their operational 
capabilities diminished) this may lead to less ambitious or strategically beneficial operational objectives. In 
other cases, if a group feels under pressure from their opponent and their capabilities are not substantially 
curtailed, a group may feel the need to assert their continued relevance or strike back at the enemy (punitively 
or to decrease his capability or distract him). 
 Higher profile attacks generally lead to less group security (McCormick543) and this is likely to factor into a 
group’s calculation of its operational objectives. 
 
General Planning Characteristics affecting Operational Objectives 
 Decision maker Time Horizon 
o The general time horizon of decision makers can affect both the scale and type of attack chosen 
during the determination of operational objectives. Some decision makers, viewing themselves 
as the vanguard of a long, historical struggle (such as certain Marxists), may be more content to 
husband their resources and embark upon more modest actions at any point in time. However, 
decision makers working to a specific timetable (even when this is a self-imposed deadline, as in 
the case of certain apocalyptic groups), may feel the need to perpetrate more ambitious attacks, 
whether punitive or coercive in nature. Of course, heightened pressure from the security forces 
of a group opponent can lead to a sense of urgency as well. Both Post544 and Pynchon545 
describe the causes and effects of a heightened sense of urgency and conclude that this 























 Risk Tolerance 
o Hypothesis: The degree of risk that a group is willing to take to conduct any single attack is an 
important factor in the setting of operational objectives. All else being equal, the greater the risk 
tolerance of a group when planning an attack, the greater the scale of the attack is likely to be. A 
corollary to this is that the more wedded the group is to the success of an attack and group 
preservation (i.e., the lower its risk tolerance), the more conservative its operational objectives 
become. Risk tolerance is a function of the group’s ideology and the external environment, 
among other variables. 
 
Attack Modalities affecting Operational Objectives 
 Palfy stresses the importance of the order in which elements of an attack are determined and states that 
“selecting a particular weapon system prior to selecting a target, will have a significant bearing on the planning 
and overall outcome of an operation” (emphasis in original).546 [Evidence Type: 1] Palfy does not, however, 
specify the manner in which planning is affected. Nonetheless, pre-selecting a particular weapon system can 
occur if, for example, a group’s ideology mandates the cleansing of society through a biological agent, 
although this is likely to be a relatively rare occurrence. If it does occur, it can have the effect of limiting the 
group’s operational objectives to those that can be achieved through the use of the pre-selected weapon. 
 
Life Cycle affecting Operational Objectives 
 Thornton states that attacks to get attention and recruit supporters and members (in the terms of the current 
model, symbolic organization-building attacks) are most common in the early stage of a group’s operations, 
and that later on in a group’s life-cycle these tactics are not expected to be as important as groups become 
more likely to engage in something closer to guerilla or symmetric combat. 547  Although Thornton admits that 
in most cases the shift to regular warfare does not occur, the above theory can today only be regarded as valid 
in an extremely limited context (for example, with some Marxist groups). There have been several recent 
cases where groups have eschewed limited, organization-building actions and jumped directly to desiring 
mass-casualty, apocalyptic-style attacks.  
 Hoffmann548 contends that in terrorist groups that survive long enough to spawn new generations of members, 
successor generations of a terrorist group or cause tend to be less idealistic, display a greater capacity for 
violence, and may even act expressively – all of which can impact elements of operational objectives such as 
desired casualty levels and the primary purpose of the attack. 
 
Perceptual Filter affecting Operational Objectives 
 Nothing noted in the literature reviewed. Perceptual filter will not affect operational objectives directly, but 
indirectly if it alters the perception of the flow of information from factors external to the group549.  
 
 



























































































































High High Medium Low Medium Medium Medium High High Medium Aviation Infrastructure 
  Low Medium Medium Low Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Unknown 
Chemical Plant Low Medium Low-Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Communication Infrastructure Low Low Low-Medium Low Low High High Medium High Unknown 
Dams and Waterways Low Medium Unknown Low Unknown Unknown Medium Medium High Unknown 
Embassies/Consulates Low Low Medium Low High High Medium High Medium High 




Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Police Stations (low impact 
only) High Medium Medium Low Unknown Unknown Medium Medium Unknown Medium 
Oil/Gas Infrastructure Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low High Low 
Power Infrastructure Low Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium-High Medium 
High Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium Public Service/ Government 
Office 
  Low Medium Low-Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium-High Medium-High Unknown 
Military Bases High High Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Railways/Railroads/Rail lines Low Medium Low-Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Roadways (low impact only) Low Medium Unknown Low Unknown Unknown Medium Unknown Medium Unknown 
Subways Low Medium Medium-High Low-High Medium-High Medium-High Medium-High High High Medium 
Train/Bus Stations Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High High Medium 
Water Treatment/ Storage 
Facility (low impact only) Low Low Low Low Unknown Unknown Low Unknown Unknown Unknown 
HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM GENERAL 
LOW LOW LOW-MEDIUM LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Physical Resources (equipment, vehicles, etc.): 
High: Plentiful vehicles, sophisticated equipment 
Medium: Standard equipment, some vehicles 
Low: Basic, minimal equipment 
Weapons: 
High: Sophisticated conventional explosives, WMD 
Medium: Large-scale simple conventional explosives  
Low: Small-scale IEDs, guns, mortars, grenades  
Financial Resources: 
High: >$50,000 available to carry out any attack. 
Medium: $10,000 – $50,000 available to carry out single attack 
Low: <$10,000 available to carry out attack 
Logistical Resources (safehouses; fake passports etc.): 
High: Vast: Competent logistical network with high redundancy 
Medium: Some safehouses and logistical competence 
Low: Minimal support network; difficulty coordinating anything other than basic attack 
Ability to innovate: 
High: Easily embraces new technologies and techniques; quickly gains tacit knowledge 
Medium: Competent at adopting new technologies and techniques, although not a particular 
strength 
Low: Difficulty adopting new technologies or techniques 
Technology level: 
High: High technical skill; aware of and capable of using newest technologies 
Medium: Standard technological level – commercial off-the-shelf technologies 
Low: Only rudimentary equipment and techniques – low-tech only 
Skill set (esp. military-type skills): 
High: Highly trained members with diverse relevant skills (e.g. explosives production, electronics) 
Medium: Some paramilitary type training, basic tradecraft 
Low: Amateurish, little to no formal training 
Familiarity with Target Environment: 
High: Intimately familiar with target environment, can blend in easily 
Medium: Some familiarity with target environment, but not perfect 
Low: Unfamiliar with target environment – easily noticeable 
Communications: 
High: Robust and extensive communications networks 
Medium: Workmanlike communications capabilities but no redundancy 
Low: only primitive, limited-channel communications possible 
 





* This is determined by comparing the relevant row (either a specific infrastructure or General) in Table 5.2 




























































































































































The worksheet provided as Appendix II can be used to aid analysts as they work through 
the DECIDe Framework. 
 
 


















Factor Influence List: Attack Modalities 
 
Operational Objectives affecting Attack Modalities 
 Operational objectives can determine whether an attack is OVERT or COVERT (in the 
sense of revealed as an intentional attacks or not), as implied by Schneier562 [Evidence 
Type: 1]. Hypothesis: symbolic attacks will be overt (at least eventually), while purely 
instrumental attacks need not be. 
 Operational objectives will mostly determine the WEAPON TYPE USED:  
o Palfy alleges that when terrorists want to reliably cause mass casualties, 
conventional weapons will be used; when fear and disruption irrespective of 
casualties is desired, terrorists may be more tempted to use unconventional 
weapons563 [emphasis added]. 
o Palfy also argues that “The relationship between the desired outcome [in our 
nomenclature, operational objectives] and terrorist weapon selection therefore 
supercedes other aspects of a given terrorist operation,”564 and “By accounting 
for both the weapon-target and intentions-outcomes relationships, it becomes 
possible to theoretically determine the best-suited weapon system for a 
specifically desired outcome.”565 
o Jackson (and several others) aver that groups seeking punitive effects could 
consider using weapons of mass destruction, “…a group seeking maximal 



















destruction for the benefit of a divine audience would likely conclude such 
destructive weapons would be appropriate to their goals.”566 
 In addition to escalating the lethality and scale of attack, another way in which a group 
could garner more media attention is to conduct a particularly sophisticated or 
technologically complex operation. 
 Jackson argues that the sophistication of terrorist operations increase as they strive to 
escalate the scale and lethality of attacks in order to gain attention and influence target 
audiences.567(Evidence Type: 1) 
 
Ideology affecting Attack Modalities 
 Hypothesis: Depending upon their ideological precepts, certain groups seem to be more 
inclined to utilize highly destructive weapons.  This will in turn affect their attack modalities. 
 Ideology also plays an important role in determining the choice of weapons and the choice 
of tactics employed in terrorist actions.568 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Resources affecting Attack Modalities 
 Advances in information technology and exchange of information have allowed terrorists to 
propagate successful attack techniques and tools. This medium of accelerated knowledge 
transfer has reduced the need for training and increased the operational capability of 
terrorists.569 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 According to Drake the size of a group affects the complexity of attacks it can conduct.570 
[Evidence Type: 1] 
 According to Woo, “off-the-shelf-weapons” are attractive to terrorists for their past record of 
success.571 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Operational Capabilities affecting Attack Modalities 
 Hoffman provides evidence to argue that a vast majority of terrorists are not tactically 
innovative but rather, employ tried and tested tactics.572 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) Characteristics on Attack Modalities 
 Hoffman suggests that terrorists gather information regarding their target to gather 
information on how to approach the targets, how to place the bomb, how the security of the 
individuals and the explosives is to be protected.573 [Evidence Type 1] 
 Drake also asserts the importance of target characteristics in determining the operational 
planning for an attack. He states that terrorists need to know the level of protection in order 
to estimate the degree of force needed to overcome any protective security.574  
[Evidence Type 1] 
 The level of security at a CI facility is a very important factor that plays a role both in the 
selection of targets and in planning the operational level of attack. An increase in the 
security level for a facility might force terrorists to invest more time and money to overcome 
the increased security measures.575 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
 













 Jackson points out that increased security measures might lead terrorists to adopt highly 
damaging tactics to overcome such protective mechanisms. As an example, Jackson cites 
that terrorists might use a guided missile to destroy a highly protected airport which is 
impregnable by vehicles or human agents.576 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 The location of a target relative to the terrorists’ base might affect the operational planning 
for a particular attack. According to Woo, the location of a target that is not in the same 
area as that of the terrorists’ base might lead the terrorists to use off-the shelf weapons 
systems and delivery systems for carrying out a particular attack.577 [Evidence Type: 1] 
 
According to Palfy, terrorist techniques become less complex when operating in an unfamiliar 
theater. Thus, the need for operations to be simple in unfamiliar environments.578  
[Evidence Type: 4] 


















































































































































out  against  Oil/Gas  Infrastructure.  Significantly,  in  the  Middle  East/North  Africa  region,  the 
attacks  on  Oil/Gas  Infrastructure  accounted  for  almost  85%  of  the  attacks  on  CI.  The  high 
percentage of attacks on CI in this region could be partly attributed to the vast number of oil and 
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Marites  Dañguilan  Vitug  and  Glenda  M.  Gloria,  Under  the  Crescent  Moon:  Rebellion  in 
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AI-1. Total Number of Major and Minor CI Attacks per Year










































































































                                                 
* This appendix was prepared by Praveen Abhayaratne, Charles Blair, and Sundara Vadlamudi. 
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AI-5. Attributable Major CI Attacks by 





















AI-6. Attributable Major & Minor CI Attacks by 











































































Latin America & Carribbean










AI-7. Attributable Major CI Attacks by 




















































































AI-8. Attributable Major & Minor CI Attacks by































































































































































































































































































































































































































AI-10. Confirmed Major & Minor Attacks by 
Perpetrator Category & Delivery Method
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AI-11. Casualties Associated with Attributable 

















AI-12. Casulaties Associated with Attributable Major and Minor 
































AI-14. Injuries Assocaited with Attributable 









































AI-16. Fatalities Associated with Attributable 

































Socialist/Communist Islamic Right-Wing Cults
 
 214
AI-18. Number of Major & Minor CI Attacks 











































































































































































































































































































































































AI-19. Fatalities by Type of Attack/Delivery for Attributable 





































AI-20. Fatalities by Year for Attributable 




















*Note to User: This worksheet is designed to be used in conjunction with the analytical framework 





DIRECTIONS:  Consider group’s inclination to attack CI based on known data. 
 
 
1) Is there specific evidence that the group is planning to 




YES _____         NO _____ 
 
2) Has the group attacked or made serious attempts to 




YES _____         NO _____ 
 
IF EITHER QUESTION IS ANSWERED “YES” A PRESUMPTION OF INTENT TO ATTACK 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE ASSUMED.  NO FURTHER ANALYSIS IS 
REQUIRED. 
 




DIRECTIONS: Collect additional information on group and its environment.  Refer to Figure 5.3 




DIRECTIONS:  Follow the DECIDe Framework analysis process detailed in Chapter 5.  Insight or 
information gained from consideration of each factor may be recorded in the spaces provided 
below.  Where “Attractiveness” or “Capability” is measured, record identified values in spaces on 
the left-hand side of the page.  To facilitate final “Determination of Intent” at the conclusion of the 
framework, it is recommended that a brief note justifying each value determination be recorded.     
 
For consistency, [A] is used to denote the “Attractiveness” to the group of attacking critical 
infrastructure targets and [C] to denote the terrorist’s perceived “Capability” to engage in a 
serious attack against critical infrastructure targets.  Increases or decreases are represented by 
“+” or “-” signs as follows: 
 
Some Increase:  +    Some Decrease: - 
 
Significant Increase: + +    Significant Decrease: - - 
 
Large Increase:  + + +    Large Decrease:  - - - 
 
Varying Increase: + . . .     Varying Decrease: - . . .  
(Dependent on Characteristics of Variable)  (Dependent on Characteristics of Variable)  
                                                 
* The DECIDe Framework worksheet was developed by Kevin S. Moran and Andrew Jayne. 
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3.1 Ideology  
 
 
 Attractiveness  Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
  




2. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 




3.   ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
  
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3.2 Organizational Structure 
 
 
 Capability  Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 




2. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 




3.3 Organizational Dynamics 
 
















Attractiveness  Rationale for Value Selection 
 
  1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
    
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
   
 __________________________________________________________ 
 



















3.6 Operational Capabilities  
  
 Capability Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
    
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
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3.7 External Relations: Sympathizers / Supporters 
 
Attractiveness Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
External Relations: State Sponsors 
 
Capability Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1a. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 




1b. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
External Relations: State Apparatus 
 
Attractiveness Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
 External Relations: Criminal and Other Extremist Groups 
 
 Attractiveness Rationale for Value Selection 
 
1. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   __________________________________________________________ 
 
External Relations: Media 
 
Attractiveness Rationale for Value Selection 
 




1b. ____ __________________________________________________________ 
 
    
   __________________________________________________________ 
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3.8 Critical Infrastructure Characteristics 
 















3.9 General Planning Characteristics  
 











    
3.10 Perceptual Filter 
 

















DIRECTIONS: Evaluate group’s operational objectives using the data recorded above and the 
process found on pages 145 – 148.  Record identified operational objectives in the space below. 
 















4.1 Operational Objectives Analysis 
 
 




YES _____         NO _____ 
 
 
IF ANSWER IS “YES” PROCEED TO CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS.   
 
IF ANSWER IS “NO” PRUSUMPTION IS GROUP WILL NOT ATTACK CRITICAL 




4.2 Capabilities Analysis  
 
 
1) Does available data indicate group preference to attack 




YES _____         NO _____ 
 
 
IF ANSWER IS “YES” USE TABLE 5.2 AND ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES 
TO DETERMINE IF GROUP HAS CAPABILITIES NECESSARY TO CONDUCT ATTACK 
AGAINST THE SPECIFIC INFRASTRUCTURE TYPE. (Identify values from Framework Table 5.2) 
 
IF ANSWER IS “NO” USE TABLE 5.2 AND ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES 
TO DETERMINE IF GROUP HAS CAPABILITIES NECESSARY TO CONDUCT A “GENERAL” 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK.   
 
 











SPECIFIC INFRASTRUCTURE  































































































































































TO CONFIRM ANALYSIS, REVIEW PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED “CAPABILITY” [“C”] VALUES 
AND AMALGAMATE IDENTIFIED INDICATORS TO: 1) CONFIRM THE PERCEIVED 
CAPABILITIES THRESHOLD; 2) ARGUE FOR ANALYST REEVALUATION, OR; 3) PROVIDE 
AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATORY MECHANISM IF DATA IS STILL INSUFFICIENT. 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances a
Dependent Variable: # of attacks(perpcat) all cases
9.537 44 414 .000
F df1 df2 Sig.
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the
dependent variable is equal across groups.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: # of attacks(perpcat) all cases
7058.760a 44 160.426 15.425 .000
2803.114 1 2803.114 269.521 .000
3525.647 8 440.706 42.374 .000
1484.182 4 371.046 35.676 .000
























































8.28 4.15 680 680.000
1.01 .12 680 680.000
1.26 .44 680 680.000
3.20 .99 680 680.000
8.17 4.36 24 24.000
1.08 .28 24 24.000
1.50 .51 24 24.000








5.00 .a 1 1.000
6.30 3.18 80 80.000
1.00 .00 80 80.000
1.11 .32 80 80.000








5.00 .a 1 1.000
7.55 4.67 42 42.000
1.00 .00 42 42.000
1.10 .30 42 42.000
3.90 1.08 42 42.000
6.42 3.18 101 101.000
1.00 .00 101 101.000
1.19 .39 101 101.000
3.39 .86 101 101.000
9.51 3.93 41 41.000
1.02 .16 41 41.000
1.34 .48 41 41.000
3.61 1.02 41 41.000
6.54 2.83 24 24.000
1.00 .00 24 24.000
1.38 .49 24 24.000
3.88 .85 24 24.000
7.05 3.82 57 57.000
1.00 .00 57 57.000
1.19 .40 57 57.000
3.42 1.03 57 57.000
9.31 5.76 29 29.000
1.00 .00 29 29.000
1.17 .38 29 29.000
4.10 1.14 29 29.000
7.91 4.11 1080 1080.000
1.01 .11 1080 1080.000
1.24 .43 1080 1080.000












































































































Tests of Equality of Group Means
.955 5.076 10 1069 .000
.986 1.533 10 1069 .122
.972 3.128 10 1069 .001













































The ranks and natural logarithms of determinants printed are
those of the group covariance matrices.
Rank < 1a. 




















Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices.
Some covariance matrices are singular and the usual
procedure will not work. The non-singular groups will
be tested against their own pooled within-groups








.077a 49.6 49.6 .268
.052a 33.4 83.1 .223
.023a 14.6 97.6 .149






















.859 162.400 40 .000
.926 82.495 27 .000
.974 28.040 16 .031













Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
.529 .608 -.650 -.023
.251 .120 .439 .866
.302 .366 .702 -.536





claim of responsibility all
cases
YEAR
1 2 3 4
Function
   
 
Structure Matrix
-.729* .677 .037 .099
.369 .768* -.521 .050
.339 .414 .680* -.501





claim of responsibility all
cases
SUCATT
1 2 3 4
Function
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and
standardized canonical discriminant functions 
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.





Functions at Group Centroids
.173 1.541E-02 -3.31E-02 -9.62E-03
.211 .442 .702 .245
-1.200 1.302 -.858 .236
-.127 -.487 -3.66E-02 6.990E-02
-1.069 1.453 -1.019 .230
-.720 .125 -.145 .109
-.330 -.244 .114 -1.75E-02
3.851E-02 .502 5.348E-04 -2.81E-02
-.625 .198 .476 -.240
-.275 -.125 2.495E-02 -2.62E-02













1 2 3 4
Function








680 3.6691 34.1291 1.3088 1.0994 6.2389 .00 741.00
24 16.3750 57.6382 11.7653 -7.9635 40.7135 .00 275.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
80 .1125 .7115 954E-024.583E-02 .2708 .00 6.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
42 5.7857 29.5045 4.5526 -3.4085 14.9800 .00 188.00
101 .3960 2.1311 .21212.467E-02 .8167 .00 20.00
41 .1707 .5875 175E-02 .470E-02 .3562 .00 3.00
24 1.4167 4.8357 .9871 -.6253 3.4586 .00 22.00
57 .6140 1.8685 .2475 .1183 1.1098 .00 9.00
29 .3103 .8906 .16542.841E-02 .6491 .00 4.00
1080 3.0231 29.0644 .8844 1.2878 4.7585 .00 741.00
680 17.3118 180.8109 6.9338 3.6975 30.9260 .00 4000.00
24 67.3750 293.1098 59.8308 -56.3944 191.1444 .00 1440.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
80 1.1125 6.9099 .7725 -.4252 2.6502 .00 60.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
42 27.1429 160.2252 24.7233 -22.7868 77.0726 .00 1038.00
101 .7624 2.7682 .2754 .2159 1.3089 .00 18.00
41 3.3902 13.3321 2.0821 -.8179 7.5984 .00 78.00
24 6.2500 24.6140 5.0243 -4.1436 16.6436 .00 120.00
57 1.3509 3.5076 .4646 .4202 2.2816 .00 17.00
29 1.5172 3.8043 .70647.015E-02 2.9643 .00 17.00
1080 13.9861 153.3913 4.6675 4.8276 23.1446 .00 4000.00
680 20.9809 198.0152 7.5935 6.0713 35.8905 .00 4213.00
24 83.7500 315.4252 64.3859 -49.4424 216.9424 .00 1523.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
80 1.2250 7.5624 .8455 -.4579 2.9079 .00 66.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
42 32.9286 165.9151 25.6013 -18.7742 84.6314 .00 1050.00
101 1.1584 4.2420 .4221 .3210 1.9958 .00 34.00
41 3.5610 13.5979 2.1236 -.7310 7.8530 .00 79.00
24 7.6667 29.0960 5.9392 -4.6195 19.9528 .00 142.00
57 1.9649 4.8512 .6426 .6777 3.2521 .00 23.00
29 1.8276 4.0889 .7593 .2722 3.3829 .00 17.00

























































Test of Homogeneity of Variances
2.628 10 1069 .004
1.831 10 1069 .051
2.318 10 1069 .011
fatalities
injuries
total number of casualties
Levene






7215.674 10 721.567 .853 .577
904258.748 1069 845.892
911474.421 1079
134159.353 10 13415.935 .568 .841
25253513 1069 23623.492
25387673 1079



























7 2.4286 6.4254 2.4286 -3.5139 8.3711 .00 17.00
162 2.3580 12.3417 .9697 .4431 4.2729 .00 115.00
66 3.1667 20.9847 2.5830 -1.9920 8.3253 .00 169.00
19 .3684 1.3829 .3172 -.2981 1.0349 .00 6.00
91 3.7143 48.4661 5.0806 3.6207 23.8078 .00 317.00
300 3.6667 45.5886 2.6321 -1.5130 8.8464 .00 741.00
15 67E-02 .2582 67E-02632E-02 .2097 .00 1.00
9 0.8889 31.9235 0.6412 13.6497 35.4275 .00 96.00
411 .4939 2.7125 .1338 .2309 .7569 .00 32.00
1080 3.0231 29.0644 .8844 1.2878 4.7585 .00 741.00
7 6.4286 43.4659 6.4286 23.7707 56.6278 .00 115.00
162 4.0556 14.9014 9.0275 -3.7720 31.8832 .00 440.00
66 9.0758 61.6133 7.5841 -6.0707 24.2222 .00 500.00
19 5.1053 17.9811 4.1252 -3.5614 13.7719 .00 78.00
91 4.7912 92.7062 1.6496 12.1802 17.4022 .00 000.00
300 1.5367 8.5247 .4922 .5681 2.5052 .00 100.00
15 1.2000 2.3664 .6110 -.1105 2.5105 .00 7.00
9 6.5556 76.7123 5.5708 32.4107 85.5219 .00 231.00
411 2.0754 10.4102 .5135 1.0660 3.0848 .00 150.00
1080 3.9861 53.3913 4.6675 4.8276 23.1446 .00 000.00
7 8.8571 49.8913 8.8571 27.2846 64.9989 .00 132.00
162 6.4136 23.0849 9.6705 -2.6837 35.5109 .00 523.00
66 2.2424 82.5078 0.1560 -8.0405 32.5254 .00 669.00
19 5.4737 18.2006 4.1755 -3.2987 14.2461 .00 79.00
91 8.5055 28.2251 5.3730 18.4973 38.5137 .00 213.00
300 5.2033 52.9590 3.0576 -.8138 11.2205 .00 841.00
15 1.2667 2.3745 .6131827E-02 2.5816 .00 7.00
9 7.4444 08.6337 6.2112 46.0588 20.9477 .00 327.00
411 2.5693 12.1864 .6011 1.3877 3.7510 .00 175.00
















































Test of Homogeneity of Variances
5.471 8 1071 .000
18.502 8 1071 .000
18.379 8 1071 .000
fatalities
injuries
total number of casualties
Levene






14052.090 8 1756.511 2.096 .034
897422.332 1071 837.929
911474.421 1079
1036521.3 8 29565.157 5.698 .000
24351152 1071 22736.836
25387673 1079
























25 2.1600 7.3862 1.4772 -.8889 5.2089 .00 32.00
9 2.1111 5.6224 1.8741 -2.2106 6.4329 .00 17.00
5 .8000 1.7889 .8000 -1.4212 3.0212 .00 4.00
12 5.1667 17.2723 4.9861 -5.8076 16.1410 .00 60.00
491 .6069 9.6505 .4355 -.2488 1.4626 .00 213.00
121 1.3306 8.5755 .7796 -.2130 2.8741 .00 83.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
10 2.1000 3.3813 1.0693 -.3189 4.5189 .00 10.00
12 2.2500 6.0321 1.7413 -1.5826 6.0826 .00 21.00
94 8.3617 76.4172 7.8818 -7.2901 24.0135 .00 741.00
9 26.4444 61.9559 20.6520 -21.1790 74.0679 .00 188.00
43 .4651 2.0395 .3110 -.1625 1.0928 .00 12.00
149 6.7987 37.6289 3.0827 .7069 12.8904 .00 317.00
54 3.1852 6.9691 .9484 1.2830 5.0874 .00 26.00
7 1.8571 3.7607 1.4214 -1.6209 5.3352 .00 10.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
4 3.5000 5.7446 2.8723 -5.6409 12.6409 .00 12.00
17 19.8235 54.2117 13.1483 -8.0495 47.6966 .00 201.00
6 2.8333 4.4008 1.7966 -1.7850 7.4516 .00 9.00
10 .9000 1.6633 .5260 -.2899 2.0899 .00 5.00
1080 3.0231 29.0644 .8844 1.2878 4.7585 .00 741.00
25 3.4400 7.8373 1.5675 .2049 6.6751 .00 30.00
9 2.4444 5.7033 1.9011 -1.9395 6.8284 .00 17.00
5 3.2000 4.3818 1.9596 -2.2407 8.6407 .00 8.00
12 1.7500 2.8002 .8083 -2.914E-02 3.5291 .00 9.00
491 9.0061 180.5537 8.1483 -7.0038 25.0160 .00 4000.00
121 15.5537 133.1932 12.1085 -8.4202 39.5277 .00 1440.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
10 9.4000 18.3073 5.7893 -3.6962 22.4962 .00 60.00
12 7.6667 15.6050 4.5048 -2.2483 17.5816 .00 50.00
94 1.8298 11.4832 1.1844 -.5222 4.1818 .00 100.00
9 19.5556 36.2323 12.0774 -8.2950 47.4061 .00 90.00
43 1.4419 5.4393 .8295 -.2321 3.1158 .00 33.00
149 26.4094 138.6058 11.3550 3.9705 48.8483 .00 1250.00
54 11.8519 28.6984 3.9054 4.0187 19.6850 .00 150.00
7 3.8571 9.3350 3.5283 -4.7763 12.4906 .00 25.00
1 5.0000 . . . . 5.00 5.00
4 284.5000 504.5404 252.2702 -518.3363 1087.3363 .00 1038.00
17 134.3529 432.7189 104.9497 -88.1306 356.8365 .00 1800.00
6 4.8333 6.1779 2.5221 -1.6500 11.3167 .00 15.00
10 .2000 .6325 .2000 -.2524 .6524 .00 2.00
1080 13.9861 153.3913 4.6675 4.8276 23.1446 .00 4000.00
25 5.6000 13.1244 2.6249 .1825 11.0175 .00 50.00
9 4.5556 8.5894 2.8631 -2.0468 11.1580 .00 22.00
5 4.0000 5.6569 2.5298 -3.0239 11.0239 .00 12.00
12 6.9167 17.8858 5.1632 -4.4474 18.2808 .00 63.00
491 9.6130 190.1752 8.5825 -7.2500 26.4761 .00 4213.00
121 16.8843 141.3437 12.8494 -8.5567 42.3253 .00 1523.00
1 .0000 . . . . .00 .00
10 11.5000 19.9011 6.2933 -2.7364 25.7364 .00 66.00
12 9.9167 21.3476 6.1625 -3.6469 23.4803 .00 71.00
94 10.1915 86.9432 8.9675 -7.6162 27.9992 .00 841.00
9 46.0000 87.8479 29.2826 -21.5259 113.5259 .00 264.00
43 1.9070 7.3737 1.1245 -.3623 4.1763 .00 45.00
149 33.2081 166.2629 13.6208 6.2917 60.1244 .00 1567.00
54 15.0370 33.6850 4.5839 5.8428 24.2313 .00 175.00
7 5.7143 12.9963 4.9122 -6.3053 17.7339 .00 35.00
1 5.0000 . . . . 5.00 5.00
4 288.0000 510.2705 255.1353 -523.9543 1099.9543 .00 1050.00
17 154.1765 482.7282 117.0788 -94.0195 402.3724 .00 2001.00
6 7.6667 8.5245 3.4801 -1.2792 16.6126 .00 23.00
10 1.1000 1.9120 .6046 -.2677 2.4677 .00 5.00



















































































Test of Homogeneity of Variances
3.534 19 1060 .000
3.063 19 1060 .000
3.125 19 1060 .000
fatalities
injuries
total number of casualties
Levene





18229.851 19 959.466 1.139 .305
893244.570 1060 842.684
911474.421 1079
606108.292 19 31900.436 1.365 .135
24781564 1060 23378.834
25387673 1079





























Name Developer(s) Supporting Literature Description 
An Integrated 
Framework for 
the Analysis of 
Group Risk for 
Terrorism 
Jerrold M. Post, 
Keven G. Ruby & Eric 
D Shaw 
Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby; and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in 
Context: An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for 
Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25 (2002), p. 73-126. 
 
“This framework provides 32 critical variables as identified by experts 
that can be used to assess the likelihood (“risk”) that a particular group 
will tend toward political violence.  The framework’s variables are 
identified within 4 overarching categories. These include: 1) External 
factors, including historical, cultural, and contextual features; 2) Key 
actors affecting the group, including the regime and other opponents, as 
well as Constituents and Supporters; 3) The Group/Organization: 
Characteristics, Processes, and Structures, including an examination of 
such factors as leadership style and decision making, group experience 
with violence, and group ideology and goals; and 4) Characteristics of 





DoD U.S. General Accounting Office. "Combating Terrorism: Threat And Risk 
Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments". 
GAO/NSIAD-98-74. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office, “Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to 
Guide Services’ Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations,” November 2002. 
 
National Infrastructure Protection Center, “Risk Management: An Essential 
Guide to Protecting Critical Assets,” November 2002. 
http://www.nipc.gov/publications/nipcpub/P-Risk%20Management.pdf 
 
“A multidisciplinary team of experts is used to identify and evaluate 
threats, assets’ criticality, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to 
manage or reduce risk.  This information is used to generate specific 
threat scenarios from valid intelligence and threat data that are then 
paired against vulnerabilities in critical assets.  Weights or values are 
assigned to these threat-asset vulnerability pairings according to the 
likelihood of such events occurring and the consequences of assets 
being compromised or attacked.”  
 
“The required assessments of threat, vulnerability and criticality of 
assets form the foundation of each installation’s antiterrorism plan and 
support a risk management approach to resource allocation.  These 
three assessments are designed to assess (1) the threats to the 
installation, (2) the installation’s vulnerabilities, and (3) the installation’s 
critical assets.” 
 




“The threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the 
basis of such factors as the threats’ capabilities, intentions, and past 
activities.  This assessment represents a systematic approach to identify 
potential threats before they materialize.  However, this assessment 
might not adequately capture some emerging threats, even in cases 
where the assessment is frequently updated.  The risk management 
approach therefore uses vulnerability and asset criticality assessments 
as additional inputs to the risk management decision-making process.” 
 
Wheel of Crises Ian I. Mitroff & Murat 
C. Alpaslan 
Ian I. Mitroff, Murat C. Alpaslan, “Preparing for Evil,” Harvard Business 
Review, April 2003. 
 
“Two executives think more broadly about potential crises, a wheel is 
spun on which a variety of categories of crises are listed.  After each 
spin, executives are required to consider and discuss all the normal and 
abnormal crises of that particular kind they can imagine.  The categories 
on the wheel are: 1) Criminal Crises such as product tampering, 
kidnapping or hostage taking, and acts of terrorism; 2) Information 
Crises such as theft of proprietary information, tampering with official 






Bruce Hope Bruce K. Hope, “A Risk Assessment Perspective on Bioterrorist Threats to the 
U.S. Food Supply,” unpublished paper. 
 
“Hope proposes a five part assessment method to evaluate, anticipate 
and manage various bio-threat scenarios.  The five parts include:  
 
1) Problem Formulation- Defining the attack scenario (target and 
exposure mode) and target (an asset and one or more of its attributes 
potentially at risk, considering the bioterrorist’s motivations and 
objectives);  
 
2) Hazard Characterization- Estimating the probable nature and 
magnitude of hazard posed to that target by that bio-agent;  
 
3) Hazard Identification- Identifying which bio-agent a bioterrorist is most 
likely to choose, considering the bioterrorist’s deployment capabilities, 
the bio-agent’s hazard capabilities, and the target.  Inability to deploy the 
preferred bio-agent will require either revision of targets or upgrading of 
deployment capabilities;  
 
4) Exposure Assessment- Estimating the probability of the target being 
exposed to the bio-agent via the exposure mode preferred by the bio-
terrorist or required by the bio-agent;  
 
5) Risk Characterization- Estimating the probability of occurrence of the 
desired adverse outcome in the target due to exposure to the bio-agent.   
 
In the absence of extensive empirical data, fault tree analysis (FTA) is 
proposed as an analytical technique appropriate for: (a) identifying and 
structuring risk factors and their relationships, (b) providing a preliminary 
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answer to the risk question posed here, and (c) identifying data needed 








Harry F. Martz and Mark E. Johnson, “Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk 
Analysis 7, (1987). 
 
“This model is designed to be a simple, flexible, low resolution model 
which can be readily used to assess the security of many different kinds 
of systems.  The model provides analytical probabilistic output of the 
outcome of a small-scale engagement between an adversary and 
security force.  It uses a semi-Markov probability model to represent the 
engagement and considers such combatant characteristic as force size, 
posture, proficiency, delay tactics, weapons type, and defense or 
assault tactics. Site parameters include cover, illumination intensity, 
security reinforcements, and range of the engagement. In calculating 
P(Ws) no security response force reinforcements are incorporated, 
because only the guard force is involved in the engagement. The output 
consists of both transient and steady state probability distributions of the 









Center for Strategic 
and International 
Studies (CSIS) 
Philip Anderson, “Threat-Vulnerability Integration: A Methodology for Risk 
Assessment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C. 
 
“The Threat-Vulnerability Integration Analysis depicts a level of risk that 
takes into consideration known or implied terrorist capabilities against 
the vulnerabilities of selected targets.  Along the horizontal axis, it 
assumes input that results from a systematic, continuous process of 
analyzing terrorist intent, capabilities, tactics and the environment in 
which he will operate – a view from the terrorist perspective.  Along the 
vertical axis, the methodology assumes input that results from a 
systematic, continuous process of analyzing the vulnerability of targets 
within the United States including target ‘attractiveness’ – again, from 
the terrorist perspective.” 
 
“Attributes of the attack means which must be considered include: 
accuracy (degree of difficulty in delivering the attack means to the 
target); destructive capacity (payload size, weight, speed, etc); flexibility 
(degree of difficulty in attack coordination and presence of contingency 
plans); opportunity (access to the target).” 
 
“Attributes of the target that must be addressed in detail include 
common elements of physical security, as viewed from the terrorist 
perspective, including: size and visibility; physical construction 
(hardness of target, failsafe mechanisms, stand-off distances); normal 
safety features (inherent design, accident mitigation systems, early 
warning systems, security personnel awareness & training, ability to 
mount counter-attack); destructive capacity of the target (magnitude of 
damage beyond the facility); accessibility (access control, personnel 
screening, vehicle/freight/package inspections); target value (system 











Nancy A. Renfroe, and Joseph L. Smith, “Threat/Vulnerability Assessments 
and Risk Analysis,” Whole Building Design Guide, Accessed on 03/11/2004 
at: http://www/wbdg/org/design/res-print.php?rp=27  
 
“A combination of the impact of loss rating and the vulnerability rating 






Chris Hawley, Gregory G. Noll, and Michael S. Hildebrand, “Operations 
Security for Public Safety Agencies: Special Operations for Terrorism and 
Hazmat Crimes,” Interagency Operations Security (OPSEC) Support Staff, 
Operations Security, Monograph Series. 
 
“The OPSEC process consists of five different steps: 1) identifying 
critical information; 2) conducting a threat analysis; 3) performing a 
vulnerability analysis; 4) assessing risks; and 5) applying 
countermeasures.” 
 
“Risk Assessment specifically weighs three basic factors based on the 
information that has been developed in the OPSEC process.  These 
include:   
 
Threat-Do(es) the Adversary(s) have Intent and the Capability? What 
does the Threat Assessment that has been conducted tell you? 
 
Vulnerability-What type of opportunity does the Adversary have to 
exploit the vulnerabilities that you have identified? 
 
Impact-What would the impact on your operation be if the Adversary 
successfully took advantage of one of your vulnerabilities?” 
 
And / Or Attack 
Tree 
Bruce Schneier Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in the Networked World 
(Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2004). 
 
“Attack trees provide a methodical way of describing threats against, 
and countermeasures protecting, a system. (…)  Basically, you 
represent attacks against a system in a tree structure, with the goal as 
the root node and different ways of achieving the goal as leaf nodes.  By 
assigning values to the nodes, you can do some basic calculations with 




Paul K. Davis, James 
H. Bigelow, & Jimmie 
McEver 
Paul K. Davis, James H. Bigelow, and Jimmie McEver, “Exploratory Analysis 
and a Case History of Multiresolution, Multiperspective Modeling,” Reprinted 
from Proceedings of the 2002 Winter Simulation Conference, Jeffrey A. 
Joines, Russell R. Barton, K. Kang, and Paul A. Fishwick (editors), December 
2000 and Proceedings of the SPIE, Vol.4026, 2000. 
 
“A key to treating uncertainty well is exploratory analysis…The 
objectives of exploratory analysis include understanding the implications 
of uncertainty for the problem at hand and informing the choice of 
strategy and subsequent modifications.  To do so, input uncertainties 
(i.e., parametric uncertainties) and structural uncertainty must be 
identified.  Input uncertainty relates to imprecise knowledge of the 
model’s input values. Structural uncertainty relates to questions about 
the form of the model itself:  Does it reflect all the variables on which the 
real-world phenomenon purportedly described by the model depends?  
Is the analytical form correct?  Input exploration, which can help address 
some of these uncertainties, involves conducting model runs across the 
space of cases defined by discrete values of the parameters within their 
plausible domains.  Probabilistic exploration represents uncertainty 
about the input parameters through distribution functions representing 
the totality of one’s so-called objective and subjective knowledge.  The 
preferred approach treats some uncertainties parametrically and others 






 Edward F. Mickolus, “How Do We Know We’re Winning the War Against 
Terrorists? Issues in Measurement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, 
(2002), pp. 151-160.  
 
“Taking an events approach, one assumes that the behaviors of 
terrorists are patterned, and that the discovery of these patterns through 
even the simplest of statistical procedures can be helpful in combating 
terrorism. With ITERATE, we code for circa 150 variables in the overall 
categories of COMMON aspects and the FATE of terrorists. We also 
examine variables that are common to HOSTAGE and HIJACKING 
incidents.  We look at such things as date and location of the incident, 
type of attack, locations of the start and end of the incident (particularly 
useful in looking at hijackings), the scene of the crime, characteristics of 
the terrorists (who was responsible, number and nationality of the 
perpetrators), victim characteristics (number, type, and nationality), 
numbers of killed and wounded (separating out by nationality of victim, 
terrorists, and response forces), dollar amount of property damage and 
type of property damaged, and some information on logistics (was there 
an accident or logistic error involved in the terrorists’ actions, weapons 
used, did the terrorists appear to succeed in their logistic aims, i.e., did 




Charles Tilly Robert W. White, “Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the 
Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence,” Frank Cass 
Journals Terrorism and Political Violence 12, (Spring 2000), pp. 95-108. 
 
“Longitudinal Research is a holistic approach in exploring the motives of 
people who engage in terrorism.  Its research is in depth and accounts 
for the general political arena that influences, and is influenced by, such 
actors.  The best research on small-group political violence is 





 Rick Whiting, “Companies Boost Sales Efforts with Predictive Analysis,” 
Information Week, Accessed on 6/7/2002. 
 
“Predictive analysis is a technique that models historical data with 
assumptive future conditions to predict outcomes or events. Predictive 
analysis includes forecasting and propensity analysis. Forecasting 
identifies trends and predicts future sales, for example. Propensity 
analysis uses data-mining algorithms such as regression analysis, 
decision trees, clustering, and neural networks to calculate predilections 




Ralph L. Keeney & 
Howard Raiffa 
Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: 
Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).  
 
“The following approach suggests how preference aspects of analysis 
might be used more constructively.  It involves the following major steps: 
  
PREANALYSIS. A unitary decision maker is assumed who is undecided 
about the course of action he or she should take in a particular problem.  
The problem has been identified and the viable action alternatives are 
given. 
 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS.  The decision maker structures the 
qualitative anatomy of his problem.  What choices can he make now?  
What choices can he defer?  How can he make choices that are based 
on information learned along the way?  What experiments can he 
perform?  What information can he gather purposefully and what can he 
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learn during the normal course of events without intentional 
intervention?  These questions are put into an orderly package by a 
decision tree. 
 
UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS: past empirical data, on assumptions fed 
into and results taken from various stochastic, dynamic models, on 
expert testimony (duly calibrated, to take into account personal 
idiosyncrasies and biases resulting from conflict of interest positions), 
and on the subjective judgments of the decision maker.  The 
assignments should be checked for internal consistencies. 
 
The decision maker must assign numbers to consequences such that 
the maximization of expected utility becomes the appropriate criterion 




 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1998), pp. ix-xiv, 50-99, and 167-77.  
 
“As a rational dissident comes to believe that his or her contribution 
makes a difference in the likelihood that the primary goal (PG) will be 
obtained, his or her participation in collective dissent increases.  A basic 
corollary follows: participants in collective dissent will report higher 
expectations of their personal efficacy than non-participants.  Intensity of 
demand (zealotry, sect. 3.1) may therefore substitute for personal 
efficacy.  Thus, the greater a rational dissident’s intensity of demand for 
a PG, the smaller his or her ‘probability of making a difference’ needs to 
be before he or she participates in collective dissent.  Similarly, personal 
efficacy may substitute for intensity of demand.  Thus, more powerful 
dissidents (i.e., those with a greater ‘probability of making a difference’) 
require less utility differential to participate in collective dissent.” 
Multiple Model 
Approach 
John Monohan et al. John Monohan, et. al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of 
Mental Disorder and Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
 
“Multiple models can be combined to produce risk assessments that are 
much more accurate than any single risk assessment model taken 
alone.  Crucial is grasping the concept that by combining a large number 
of models, each of which contains a different combination of risk factors, 
the stability of the risk assessments for each individual is increased 
dramatically.  Using this “multiple model” approach, we ultimately 
combined the results of five prediction models generated by the Iterative 
Classification Tree methodology.  The multiple model approach 
minimizes the problem of data over-fitting that can result when a single 
“best” prediction model is used.”   
 
Game Theory  Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M., “Terrorism & Game Theory,” Simulation 
and Gaming 34, (September 2003), pp. 319-337. 
 
“Game theory is an appropriate tool for examining terrorism for a 
number of reasons.  First, game theory captures the strategic 
interactions between terrorists and a targeted government, where 
actions are interdependent…Second, strategic interactions among 
rational actors, who are trying to act according to how they think their 
counterparts will act and react, characterize the interface between 
terrorists…Third, in terrorist situations, each side issues threats and 
promises to gain a strategic advantage.  Fourth, terrorists and 
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governments abide by the underlying rationality assumption of game 
theory, where a player maximizes a goal subject to constraints. 
Empirical support for terrorists’ rationality is given credence by their 
predictable responses to changes in their constraints…Fifth, game-
theoretic notions of bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations 
and terrorist campaign-induced negotiations over demands.  Sixth, 
uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are relevant to all 
aspects of terrorism, in which the terrorists or government or both are 





DOE Department of Energy, “Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk 
Assessment Checklists for State Governments,” December 4, 2001. 
http://www.appanet.org/operations/checklist.pdf 
 
“To identify and evaluate the threat environment to which an 
organization may be exposed the following questions should be 
answered: What are the specific goals and objectives of the adversary?  
What does the adversary gain by achieving these goals?  How will the 
adversary achieve its goals through exploiting our assets?  Is the 
adversary aware that the asset exists? 
Does the adversary know enough about the asset to plan an attack?  Is 
the adversary willing to risk being caught?  Are there other, less risky 
means for an adversary to attain his/her goals?  What is the probability 
that the adversary will choose one method of attack over another?  
What specific events might provoke the adversary to act?  What might 
the adversary lose in attempting to exploit our assets? 
Would that loss be a rational trade-off, from the adversary’s 




US Secret Service Randy Borum, Robert Fein, BryanVossekuil, and John Berglund, “Threat 
Assessment: Defining an Approach for Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence,” 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 17, (1999), pp. 323-337. 
 
“Threat assessment is a set of investigative and operational activities 
designed to identify, assess, and manage persons who may pose a 
threat of violence to identifiable targets.  Conceptually, this approach is 
innovative in two ways: (1) it does not rely on descriptive, demographic, 
or psychological profiles and (2) it does not rely on verbal or written 
threats as a threshold for risk.  Instead of looking at demographic and 
psychological characteristics, the threat assessment approach focuses 
on a subject's thinking and behaviors as a means to assess his/her 
progress on a pathway to violent action. The question in a threat 
assessment is not `What does the subject `look like'?’ but ‘Has the 
subject engaged in recent behavior that suggests that he/she is moving 
on a path toward violence directed toward a particular target(s)?’  To 
accurately conduct such a threat assessment, three types of information 
about the subject are typically collected; identifying information, 
background information, and information about the subject's current 
situation and circumstances.” 
 
Order Theory  Jonathan David 
Farley 
Jonathan David Farley, “Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of 
Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision 
Making), Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, (2003), pp. 399–411. 
 
“Order theory provides a framework for not only breaking up terrorist 
networks into disconnected (non-communicating) parts, but also cutting 
the leaders off from the followers.  One criterion might be to say that a 
terrorist cell has been broken if it is no longer able to pass orders down 
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from the leaders to the foot soldiers—the men and women who, 
presumably, will carry out the attacks.  This is by no means the only 
possible criterion, but it enables us to make precise estimates of the 
possibility that our operations have successfully disabled a terrorist cell.” 
 
“How can law enforcement quantify how effective it has been in 
disrupting a particular terrorist cell?  As we have stated, one way to 
make this precise is to say that a terrorist cell has been disrupted not 
when all of its members have been captured or killed (which might be 
too costly in terms of money, agents, and agents’ time), but when all 
chains of command have been broken.  That is, the collection of nodes 
in the network corresponding to the terrorists who have been killed or 
captured should be acutest.  This enables us to calculate—not merely 
guess—the probability that a terrorist cell has been disrupted.”   
 




“A Markov chain is defined by the series of states that Al Qaeda 
occupies, and makes transitions to and from.  This is a controlled 
Markov chain because, whatever state Al Qaeda occupies, the police 
and security forces counter the prevailing threat with actions which aim 
ton control terrorism... In mathematical terms, these counter-actions are 





Joshua Sinai Dr. Joshua Sinai, "ICT Conference: Expert on Value, Methods of Forecasting 
Terrorist Incidents," FBIS Report, Document ID: GMG20031202000085, 
September 9, 2003.   
 
“This model creates pre-incident attack observables during the crucial 
incubation period that can be identified, monitored, preempted, and 
disrupted at the earliest possible phases.  The pre-incident incubation 
process can be broken into four phases: the formation of a group; 
planning an attack; developing a capability; and executing the operation.  
This model uses 31 indicator categories to enable the user to 
understand all the indicators that need to be looked at in figuring out the 














“Game theory predicts that, as prime targets are hardened, rational 
terrorists will tend to substitute lesser softer targets…Target substitution, 
as this is called, is a prediction about the rational behavior of terrorists, 
affirmation of which must ultimately come from the mouths of terrorists 
themselves.” 
 
“If paradise is the payoff for martyrdom, then an Islamic militant would 
wish to be maximally sure of hitting the target, and would tend to attack 
later (i.e. closer to the target). Taking sufficient time to achieve mission 
success is a trait of al-Qaeda. The patience and diligence with which al-
Qaeda operations are planned to reflect underlying fundamentalist belief 
in the high payoff of a suicide mission. Not just the preparation time, but 
also the swarm attack is a feature of al-Qaeda strategy which is 




“In applying game theory to terrorism, it is important to leave behind 
popular notions of rationality, and to return to the formal mathematical 
definition of rational behavior, namely that actions are taken in 
accordance with a specific preference relation. There is no requirement 
that a terrorist’s preference relation should involve economic advantage 
or financial gain…Nor is it necessary that a terrorist’s preference relation 




 Codex Alimentarius Commission, “Principles and Guidelines for the Conduct 
of Microbiological Risk Assessment,” CAC/GL-30, 1999. 
 
“There are seven steps to follow in conducting a Microbiological Risk 
Assessment: 1) Statement of Purpose of Risk Assessment; 2) Hazard 
Identification; 3) Exposure Assessment; 4) Hazard Characterization; 5) 
Risk Characterization; 6) Documentation; 7) Reassessment.” 
 
The conduct of a Microbiological Risk Assessment should be 
transparent.  Any constraints that impact on the Risk Assessment such 
as cost, resources or time, should be identified and their possible 
consequences described.  The Risk Estimate should contain a 
description of uncertainty and where the uncertainty arose during the 
Risk Assessment process.  Data should be such that uncertainty in the 
Risk Estimate can be determined; data and data collection systems 
should, as far as possible, be of sufficient quality and precision that 
uncertainty in the Risk Estimate is minimized.  Wherever possible, Risk 
Estimates should be reassessed over time by comparison with 
independent data.  A Microbiological Risk Assessment may need 









Law of Energy 
Conservation and 
Game Theory 




“In hydrology, the principle of minimum energy expenditure governs the 
pattern of river drainage networks.  In a similar way to the flow of water, 
the flow of al-Qaeda terrorism activity is towards weapon modes and 
targets, against which the technical, logistical and security barriers to 
mission success are least.  In order to express target prioritization in a 
quantitative way, the ranking by city and target type has to be converted 
into mathematical form.  This interpolation is simply achieved by 
invoking Fechner’s Law, which states that an arithmetic progression in 
perceptions requires a geometrical progression in their stimuli.  In order 
to arrive at a target probability distribution, a mathematical expression 
needs to be obtained for the functional dependence of target probability 





Office of Domestic 
Preparedness, DHS 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Office for Domestic Preparedness 
(OPD), “Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report,” Phase I Final 
Report, July 2003. 
 
“Risk [R] = Consequences [C] times Likelihood [L] or C x L.  Likelihood 
can be further defined in terms of a specific vulnerability [V] that is 
exploited by a specific adversary or threat [T]. Each of these events is a 
probability. Hence, Likelihood is a conditional probability expressed as: 
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[L] = p[T] x p[V].” 
 
“Risk may be defined more fully as the product of consequences or 
impact [I] to the owner in case of loss or damage to a valued asset, and 
the likelihood that the asset may be damaged or destroyed by a 
particular adversary exploiting a specific vulnerability: R = I x p[T] x 
p[V].” 
 
“The threat is any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to 
cause loss of or damage to an asset. In its traditional definition, a threat 
is a product of intention and capability of an adversary, both manmade 
and natural, to undertake an action which would be detrimental to an 
asset.  A vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by an 





Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) 
Steve Eisenhower, Terry Bott, and D.V. Rao, “Assessing the Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism Using Logic Evolved Decision Analysis,” Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LA-UR-03-3467). 
 
“The model proposed here is based on a game theoretic perspective 
where the set of attackers and the defender play an extensive game 
with imperfect information.  We perform the risk evaluation using 
approximate reasoning (AR).  AR uses a series of forward-chained rule 
bases to emulate expert judgment.  It is particularly well suited to 
decision problems where much of the data is qualitative and many of the 
relevant factors and their importance are perceptual in nature.” 
 
“Two process trees are essential for decision analysis: a possibility tree 
that represents a comprehensive set of alternatives, in this case terrorist 
attack scenarios and an inference tree that defines how a metric is to be 
inferred.” 
 
“The inferential model incorporates a game theoretic perspective.  The 
game to be played is asymmetric.  A specific attacker will choose to 
attempt only a particular subset of attack scenarios associated with 
particular targets and employing specific attack modes.  He will attempt 
to allocate his assets in order to inflict the maximum amount of terror.  
The defender on the other hand must try to protect all of the targets for 
which he bears responsibility against all attack scenarios.  He will 
attempt to minimize his risk.” 
 
“The model is advanced because it is insufficient to concentrate on the 
vulnerability of homeland targets to the exclusion of attacker motivation, 





Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) 
Terr F. Bott and Stephen Eisenhower, “Evaluating Complex Systems When 
Numerical Information is Sparse,” Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
Terry F. Bott, Stephen W. Eisenhower, Jonathan Kingson, and Brian P. Key, 
“A New Graphical Tool for Building Logic-Gate Trees,” Los Alamos National 
Laboratory and Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc. 
“A system behavior of interest is modeled with a deductive logic model 
called a system process tree, which gives us an organized list of 
possible paths leading to the final system state of interest.  A forward-
chaining implication structure that combines individual factors using 
approximate reasoning (AR) techniques produces a Figure of Merit 
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 evaluation of each of the possible paths to a system state.  The method 
for evaluating the possibilities can then be described as a forward-linked 
implication structure.” 
 
“The basic elements of a decision model are: 1) Determine the 
possibilities or alternatives; 2) Select the metric to rank the possibilities; 
3) Design an inferential model for the metric; 4) Rank the possibilities 
according to the metric; 5) Express the degree of uncertainty in the 
results; 6) Express the results in a form useful to the decision maker.” 
 
“The fundamental assumption underlying the use of the possibility tree is 
that complex system behavior can be modeled by logically connecting 
sets of discrete events and states, called the “elements” of the tree.  
This fundamental assumption is rendered less restrictive by introducing 
logic gates that model complex relationships between elements such as 
cycles and conditional branching.” 
 
“To construct a possibility tree, information about system processes is 
extracted from sources of general knowledge, expert judgments, and 
observations, by analogy, or through heuristics.  This knowledge is 
converted into discrete elements that are linked together using logic 
gates as connectives.  The system  characteristics thus are uncovered 
deductively from all known sources of relevant information using step-
by-step causality-based reasoning.  This reasoning process produces a 
hierarchical tree structure with well-defined connections between levels 
of the tree.  The tree structure often can be used to capture competing 





 Karen Guttieri, Michael D. Wallace, Peter Suedfeld, University of British 
Columbia, “The Integrative Complexity of American Decision Makers in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, No. 4, (Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, Inc., 1995). 
 
“The policy-maker considers a number of dimensions of the problem or 
perspectives on it and searches for alternative solutions (i.e., 
differentiation), weighs the alternatives in light of their probabilities of 
success, and chooses a course of action designed to maximize positive 
values and minimize losses, based on theoretical beliefs about the 
effects of those actions and other considerations such as morality, 
tradition, and values (i.e., integration).” 
 
The cognitive manager model…portrays cognitive reaction to such 
stressors as analogous to the general adaptation syndrome…The 
mobilization of cognitive resources in response to the recognition of a 
crisis is analogous to the alarm reaction.  Resistance, an ongoing level 
of relatively high complexity (depending on the perceived importance of 




 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
“The CFD is an outgrowth of the “influence diagram.”  It is particularly 
useful for outlining work processes and to delineate logical and 
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 mathematical relationships between risk-model variables.  It is important 
to recognize that a CFD is not a flow chart, particularly in that its factors 




 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
 
“Bayesian Model Averaging is a technique designed to help account for 
the uncertainty inherent in the model selection process, something 
which traditional statistical analysis often neglects. By averaging over 
many different competing models, BMA incorporates model uncertainty 
into conclusions about parameters and prediction. BMA has been 
applied successfully to many statistical model classes including linear 
regression, generalized linear models, Cox regression models, and 





 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
 
“Solving decision trees probabilistically simply replaces the leaf-node 
deterministic values with distributions, and the tree is solved many 
times.  On each solution of the tree, a random grab is made from each 
leaf-node distribution and the expected value is calculated in the usual 
way.  Repeated random grabs and solutions of the tree result in a 




 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
 
“Monte Carlo analysis uses the process of simulation to achieve a range 
of solutions to a problem.  The technique is generally used to solve 
problems for which the definition of specific solution equations to 
calculate a specific answer is either too complex or too cumbersome to 
be practical.  The term can be applied to any procedure that uses 
distribution-based random sampling to approximate solutions to 
probabilistic or deterministic problems.  The most common application 
involves determining the probability that a certain event (or result) will 




 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
 
“Time-series analysis is a function that helps risk modelers better 
emulate actual situations, because it allows such analysis to break free 
of the single period assessment and to project the analysis through time.  
This can be done by transforming single values into previously identified 




 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
 
“Sensitivity analysis aids in identifying the elements of a risk model that 
were most and least important to the calculation of the answer.  Most 
comprehensive risk studies are composed of many input and output 
variables.  Sensitivity analysis is used to determine which risk-model 





 Glenn Koller, Risk Modeling for Determining Value and Decision Making 
(Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000). 
“Model used to relatively rank and compare contenders concerning 
particularly risk.  It is designed from consensus by experts and is 
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 generic in nature.  The benefit of such an approach is that the model 
can be used time and again to evaluate new or reevaluate previously 
considered situations.  Weights are used in the model to afford those 
applying the risk model the ability to emphasize or de-emphasize the 
various model components.  To communicate risk model results to 
decision makers, a comprehensive cost model might be developed that 
translates the risk mitigation actions into financial terms.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
